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PREFACE 
A decade following the 9/11 attacks, the objectives and motivations 
of Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda remain largely unknown to the 
American public.  Since the mission of Al-Qaeda is embedded in its in-
terpretation of the history and traditions of Islam, increased analysis on 
the intellectual framework of Al-Qaeda provides valuable insight into 
this dangerous ideology that will remain a strategic threat to the United 
States for the foreseeable future.  While more recent successes against 
the Al-Qaeda organization have encouraged talk of “the end of Al-
Qaeda,” the broader ideology remains alive and well.  The rise in support 
for the Islamist groups in Egypt and North Africa, increasing terrorist at-
tacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the escalating sectarian war in 
Syria all affirm the continued relevance of this topic and its interdiscipli-
nary relationship with national security, global affairs, and international 
law.  This thesis provides a brief primer of what the Islamist ideology 
stands for, its relationship to the Islamic religion, and how understanding 
this history can play a central role in assessing long-term American in-
terests.   
There are no concrete answers as to how to address the terrorist threat Al-
Qaeda poses, and solutions are as varied as the very problem itself.  
Knowledge and understanding of the enemy are important in the War on 
Terrorism.  It allows the United States and its allies to evaluate their strate-
gies and adjust their tactics to combat Al-Qaeda effectively.  The challenge 
for military and civilian leaders is to try to objectively understand Al-
Qaeda through its evolution, recognize its dangers, and understand how 
their action can influence the current war against it.
1
 
  -U.S. Army Major Sean Wilson  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The 2011 death of Osama Bin Laden at the hands of U.S. forces in 
Pakistan seemed to bookend a decade-long effort of the United States to 
dismantle the Al-Qaeda network.  To Americans in the millennial gener-
ation, Bin Laden represented the face of Islamist terrorism akin to how 
previous generations of Americans perceived the extraterritorial threats 
posed by Adolf Hitler, the Nazi leader of Germany, and Joseph Stalin, 
the leader of the rivaling Cold War superpower, the Soviet Union.  How-
                                                             
1
 Sean P. Wilson, The Evolution of Al-Qaeda (June 15, 2007) (unpublished M.A. 
thesis, American Military University), available at http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/ 
fulltext/u2/a471461.pdf. 
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ever, unlike the defeat of Nazi fascism in World War II or the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in 1989, the death of Bin Laden did not end the long-
term threat of Islamist terrorism to the United States. 
Following the formal announcement of Bin Laden’s assassination, 
politicians and pundits opined on the impact of Bin Laden’s death for 
American national security interests in the fight against Islamist terror-
ism.  Many answers were given in the form of quick one-liners that often 
offered little more than a mere expression of celebratory American na-
tionalism.  As I watched the news I became both frustrated and per-
plexed:  having spent the majority of my academic research on issues 
surrounding Islam, the Middle East, and global terrorism, I was stunned 
by the inability or unwillingness of many political leaders to articulate 
comprehensive analysis related to the objectives of Al-Qaeda and the 
larger issues surrounding the Islamic world.   
In 2004, the 9/11 Commission Report powerfully noted that “[t]he 
history, culture, and body of beliefs from which Bin Laden has shaped 
and spread his message are largely unknown to most Americans.”
2
  Of 
greater concern, however, were the subsequent findings of a 2006 New 
York Times article that asked leading policymakers, including a Con-
gressman and a top counter-terrorism official, a relatively simple ques-
tion: What is the difference between Sunni and Shia Islam?
3
  The re-
sponses depicted a lack of elementary knowledge of Islam, with one 
Congressman, who was unable to answer, poignantly stating, “Now that 
you’ve explained it to me. . . what occurs to me is that it makes what 
we’re doing over there extremely difficult, not only in Iraq but that 
whole area.”
4
  Since the objectives of Al-Qaeda are embedded in their 
interpretation of Islamic history, the continued lack of knowledge of Is-
lam by both policymakers and the larger American public inhibits the 
ability of the United States to optimally conduct counter-terrorism poli-
cy.  As former CIA analyst Michael Scheuer notes:  
Bin Laden is fully conscious of the historical resonance of his activities, 
and the importance of Islamic history and its heroes in his rhetoric cannot 
be overestimated.  Although largely illiterate, the Muslim masses know 
their faith’s history – particularly military – and its heroes far better than 
                                                             
2
 NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION N 
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE 
U.S. 48 (2004). 
3
 Jeff Stein, Can You Tell a Sunni From a Shiite?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/17/opinion/17stein.html?pagewanted=all. 
4
 Id. (In 2006 the article had unique importance because at the time Iraq was disinte-
grating into a civil war between Sunni and Shia Muslims). 
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Westerners know theirs.  Through sermons, storytelling, and oral histories, 
passed from one generation to the next down the centuries, Muslims are in-
timately familiar with the Islamic past and tend to talk about it in their daily 
lives.
5
 
If a sense of the historical continuity of Islam is not acquired by pol-
icymakers, the ability of the United States to properly calculate its long-
term national security interests against Al-Qaeda and like-minded Islam-
ist movements is severely compromised.   
The primary thesis of this paper is that one cannot completely un-
derstand Al-Qaeda and the contemporary dynamics of the Islamic world 
without awareness of the previous religious and political events that gave 
rise to the modern alignments and ideologies of today.  This unique and 
holistic approach to explaining the rise of Al-Qaeda through the lens of 
Islamic history will illuminate the fact that one is unable to decipher both 
the operational elements of the organization and the larger ideology 
without viewing its other interrelated parts.  Although in isolation some 
of these topics may seem like disparate issues, their interconnectivity and 
significance are presented as pieces of a cohesive mosaic.   
First, it is imperative to make a crucial distinction between the terms 
Islamic and Islamist – the latter, a term that is often used in modern polit-
ical discourse but rarely, if ever, explained.  The term Islamic broadly 
refers to anything related to the Muslim religion and its traditions.  On 
the other hand, the term Islamist is a very specific designation primarily 
used by Western scholars to identify individuals who support the concept 
of Islamism.  Islamism concerns a textualist interpretation of Islam and 
its efforts to bring the modern Islamic community in line with the exam-
ples and teachings of early Muslims during the time of the Prophet.  Dan-
iel Pipes explains that: 
Islamism is an ideology that demands man’s complete adherence to the sa-
cred law of Islam and rejects as much as possible outside influence, with 
some exceptions (such as access to military and medical technology).  It is 
imbued with a deep antagonism towards non-Muslims and has a particular 
hostility towards the West.  It amounts to an effort to turn Islam, a religion 
and civilization, into an ideology.
6
 
                                                             
5 MICHAEL SCHEUER, OSAMA BIN LADEN 167 (2011). 
6
 Daniel Pipes, Distinguishing between Islam and Islamism, DANIEL PIPES MIDDLE 
EAST FORUM (June 30, 1998),  http://www.danielpipes.org/954/di stinguishing-between-
islam-and-islamism; but see John Esposito, Islamic Fundamentalism, BRITANNICA 
ONLINE (Nov. 7, 2012, 2:57 PM), http://www.ag-afghanistan.de/funda.htm  (arguing 
against the usage of the term Islamic fundamentalism: “The term Islamic fundamental-
ism, while commonly used, is regarded by many as misleading.  The term fundamental-
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While Al-Qaeda is considered an Islamist organization – arguably 
the most violent and extremist – it is only one of many that share similar 
ideological objectives.  Although the specific platform of each Islamist 
group is slightly different, generally they share the goal of creating a 
‘true’ Islamic state with the strict implementation of Islamic law, Sha-
ria.
7
  Al-Qaeda, cemented in the Western conscious as the world’s most 
notorious Islamist organization, is the cornerstone of modern analysis 
because of its unrivaled leadership in Islamist terrorism during the past 
twenty years.     
It is of utmost importance to note that the majority of the world’s 
Muslims do not support the militant objectives of extremist Islamist 
movements.  In 2009 a survey by the Pew Global Attitudes Poll asked 
Muslim respondents if they supported Bin Laden in world affairs, with 
the percentage of respondents who answered yes as follows: Jordan 28%, 
                                                                                                                                        
ism is laden with Christian perspectives and Western stereotypes, and it implies a mono-
lithic threat.  More useful terms are Islamic revivalism and Islamic activism, which are 
less value-laden and have roots within a tradition of political reform and social activism.”  
Id.  While the author of this article believes Islamic extremism is an appropriate term to 
describe elements of the Islamist ideology, Islamic revivalism also provides an adequate 
description as well.). 
7
 KNUT VIKOR, BETWEEN GOD AND THE SULTAN 257 (2005); see RUDOLPH PETERS, 
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE FROM THE SIXTEENTH 
TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 144 (2005) (Peters powerfully expands on the objectives 
of Islamists:  
“The Islamists wanted to establish an Islamic state, and the main characteristic of 
an Islamic state was, for them, the enforcement of Sharia in all domains. . . .The 
introduction of the Sharia became a rallying cry of the religiously inspired political 
movements.  The idea of going back to the cultural roots and of imposing Islamic 
norms on society was appealing to large segments of the population that were op-
posed to the increasing Western political and cultural influence. . . . 
The crucial element is that Muslims, in order to be good Muslims, must live in an 
Islamic state, a state which implements Sharia.  It is not sufficient that such a state 
gives Muslims the choice to follow or not to follow the Sharia: it must actually 
impose Sharia on them, by implementing Islamic criminal law.  Preaching and 
admonition do not suffice, and a big stick is needed to change behavior in an Is-
lamic direction.  Islamic criminal law is a tool to impose a moral order on society, 
by enforcing rigorous rules, especially in the fields of sexual morality, blasphemy, 
and the consumption of alcohol and drugs.  
The establishment of an Islamic state is presented as a religious duty for all Mus-
lims and as an endeavor that may bring Paradise within their reach.  And there is 
another felicitous prospect connected with it: that of a pious and virtuous commu-
nity on earth that enjoys God’s favor and is actively aided by Him to overcome 
poverty and humiliation.  Such a community will be prosperous and strong.  The 
reintroduction of Islamic criminal law is, from this perspective, a step towards sal-
vation in the Hereafter as well as in this life.  It is, therefore, much more than a 
merely technical reform of penal law.”). 
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Indonesia 25%, Egypt 23%, Pakistan 18%, Israeli Muslims 16%, Leba-
non 4%, and Turkey 2%.
8
  In 2012 the same organization provided up-
dated data on opinions of Al-Qaeda, with the favorable responses as fol-
lows: Egypt 21%, Jordan 15%, Turkey 6%, and Lebanon 2%.
9
  The Pew 
study noted that in Pakistan, where Bin Laden was killed and a tradition-
al stronghold for Al-Qaeda, 18% of the population did not participate be-
cause it was too dangerous for pollsters to conduct the survey.
10
         
The above data demonstrates that Al-Qaeda is a peripheral organi-
zation that does not represent the views of a majority of the Islamic 
world.  Nonetheless, the same polls also indicate that within the Islamic 
world there is a segment of the population that is sympathetic, if not sup-
portive, of Al-Qaeda and its aggressive Islamist agenda.  If the decade 
since 9/11 has revealed nothing else, it showed that all it takes is a few 
individuals to effectuate an attack or encourage others to join their cause.  
Thus it is the sizeable and vocal Islamist minority whose ideology must 
be understood by policymakers, as they remain, and will continue to re-
main, a potential threat to U.S. security interests.  As this radical Islamist 
ideology emanates from the nuances of Islamic history, it is only with a 
broader working knowledge of Islam can the seemingly complex objec-
tives of Islamists be properly understood.      
The paper is divided into three sections of historical analysis: (1) the 
origins of Islam from the time of the Prophet Muhammad and the rise of 
the Islamic state in 633 until the collapse of the Abbasid caliphate in 
1258, (2) the post-caliphate Islamic world and the growth of the Islamist 
ideology from the mid-thirteenth century until 1979, and (3) the impact 
of the U.S.S.R. invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the subsequent de-
velopment of Al-Qaeda, the organization that orchestrated the attacks of 
9/11 under the leadership of Osama Bin Laden.  A second level of analy-
sis chronicles Al-Qaeda following the 9/11 attacks and acknowledges re-
cent developments in the Islamic world, including the “Arab Spring” and 
the assassination of Bin Laden.  A conclusion provides final thoughts on 
the long-term challenges posed by Al-Qaeda and the Islamist ideology.  
Accordingly, the historical journey begins in seventh-century Arabia 
where the revelations of the Prophet Muhammad and the religion of Is-
lam first originate. 
                                                             
8 Patrick Goodenough, Support for Suicide Bombings and Bin Laden Still High 
Among Some Muslims, CNS NEWS, Sept. 11, 2009, http://cnsnews.com/ node/53865. 
9 William C. Mann, Poll: Little Muslim Support for Bin Laden’s Group, 
OMAHA.COM (Apr. 30, 2012, 5:36 PM), http://www.omaha.com/article/2012043 
0/AP09/304309879. 
10 Id. 
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II. ISLAM AND HISTORY 
A. The Development of Islam under the Prophet Muhammad 
Islamic history begins in seventh century Arabia, which was charac-
terized by tribal violence and stuck in the cross-roads of a regional war 
between the competing world powers of the time, the Byzantine and Per-
sian Empires.
11
  Born in 570 and orphaned at a young age, the Prophet 
Muhammad began work as a manager near commercial trading routes in 
the bustling city of Mecca, where he quickly developed a reputation 
among peers as a man of sound judgment.
12
  Muhammad routinely trav-
eled from Mecca to Mt. Hira where he engaged in reflective thought and, 
at the age of forty, it was at Mt. Hira that he received the first of his reve-
lations from God through the angel Gabriel.
13
  Over a period of twenty-
two years, from 610 to 632, Muhammad received divine revelations from 
God that were later collected and recorded in the Quran (“The Recita-
tion”), the Islamic holy book.
14
 
During the early seventh century, polytheism in Mecca thrived.  The 
Umayyads, the leading Meccan tribe and overseers of the Kaba (a shrine 
that held tribal idols), promoted the continuance of polytheism.
15
  As the 
head of the Islamic nation, Muhammad led as a reformer who sought to 
bring the polytheistic Arabian people back to a monotheistic religion and 
reaffirm the idea of “one, true God” in the same tradition of Abraham, 
the first monotheist.
16
  Citing the societal ills of Meccan life at the time, 
such as corruption and materialism, Muhammad believed the people of 
Arabia were in a state of ignorance and unbelief known as jahiliyyah.
17
  
Although Muhammad claimed the same monotheistic tradition of Adam, 
Abraham, Moses, and Jesus, Muhammad believed both Jews and Chris-
tians did not correctly reveal the word of God. 
18
 Thus, Muhammad 
called for the “total surrender or submission to Allah (islam) and the im-
plementation of His will as revealed in its complete form one final time 
                                                             
11 JOHN ESPOSITO, UNHOLY WAR: TERROR IN THE NAME OF ISLAM 29 (2002) [herein-
after UNHOLY WAR]. 
12 JOHN ESPOSITO, ISLAM: THE STRAIGHT PATH 5-6 (2005) [hereinafter THE STRAIGHT 
PATH]. 
13 Id. at 6. 
14 Id. at 6-7. 
15 Id. at 8. 
16 Id. at 8, 12. 
17 UNHOLY WAR, supra note 10, at 11. 
18 THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra note 12, at 12. 
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to Muhammad, the last. . . of the prophets.”
19
  
The foundation of Islam is based on the Quran (the message of God 
transmitted by Muhammad) and the sunna (the actions and words of the 
Prophet recorded by his followers).  The Quran, preserved in oral and 
written tradition during the lifetime of Muhammad and later codified in 
an official version between 644 and 656, is viewed by Muslims as the lit-
eral word of God transmitted through the angel Gabriel to Muhammad.
20
  
In addition, Muhammad was viewed as the example that all Muslims 
should strive to follow, and thus the actions of the Prophet were a central 
component of the early Islamic religious and legal traditions.
21
  Since 
Muhammad was in effect a “living Quran,” stories recounting the actions 
and words of the Prophet, known as the sunna, became an early source of 
Islamic law that equaled the importance of the Quran itself.
22
  The indi-
vidual stories of the Prophet, known as hadith, were collected in both 
oral and written form and all the hadith collected together formed the 
sunna.
23
 
Muhammad’s message during the first ten years of the Revelation – 
steadfastly supported by early converts that included Abu Bakr (a long-
time companion of Muhammad who became the leader of the Islamic 
community following the death of the Prophet) and Ali (Muhammad’s 
cousin and son-in law) – was met with suspicion and prosecution by the 
governing Meccan authorities.
24
  In 622, while under siege by Meccan 
tribal rulers, Muhammad accepted an offer to serve as an arbiter between 
warring Arab tribes in the city of Medina, thus rising to a leadership po-
sition in the community.
25
  Muhammad outlined the duties of all citizens 
in the Constitution of Medina and succeeded in unifying Arab tribes un-
der the religious and governmental order of Islam, with the Prophet as its 
                                                             
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 6-7, 20-21. 
21 Id. at 11-12. 
22 Id. at 11. 
23 Id. at 80; see VIKOR, supra note 7, at 32 (“Muslim tradition came to accept [God’s 
Revelation] as expressed in two ways: in the Koran, which contains God’s own words; 
and through the Prophet’s sunna, Muhammad’s normative sayings and doings expressed 
in hadith.  Both are revelation, but they are different in nature.  The Koran has an estab-
lished and certain content; there is no disagreement among Muslims over its actual 
words, but it needs to be read correctly to be understood.  The other source, however, the 
sunna, does not have such a clear delimitation.  It must go through a dual process; it must 
first be determined whether each individual hadith is actually a true expression from the 
Prophet before one can draw any normative inferences from its text.  But both the Koran 
and true hadith are equally valid expressions of God’s revelation.”). 
24 THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra note 12, at 7-8. 
25 Id. at 8-9. 
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leader.
26
  In addition, the two hundred individuals that followed Mu-
hammad from Mecca to Medina were considered the first members of 
the Islamic community, known as the umma.
27
  Once the Islamic state in 
Medina was established, Muhammad pursued the idea of capturing Mec-
ca, the city at the heart of power and culture in Arabia, in the name of Is-
lam.
28
   
The relationship between religion and political power in the Islamic 
tradition merits further discussion.  Muhammad “served as both the reli-
gious and political head of Medina: prophet of God, ruler, military com-
mander, chief judge, [and] lawyer.”
29
   Religion and political power were 
“indissolubly associated” elements within the Muslim community, which 
led the celebrated scholar of Islamic history, Bernard Lewis, to powerful-
ly comment, “the Founder of Islam was his own Constantine, and found-
ed his own state and empire.”
30
  For readers in the West it can be an ar-
duous task, yet of utmost importance, to conceptualize this distinction 
between the Islamic and Christian traditions in their respective approach-
es to religion and political power.  As Lewis notes, the dualistic approach 
of the Christian tradition which separates church and state – and guided 
by the oft-cited maxim found in Matthew XXII: 21, “render unto Caesar 
which are Ceasar’s; and render unto God the things which are God’s”  – 
is not present in early Islamic history and jurisprudence.
31
      
Before returning to Muhammad’s attempt to capture Mecca, it is 
important to address the topic of Islamic holy war, known as jihad.  One 
of the central tenants of Islam is the idea of jihad, which has two mean-
ings: (1) moral striving, and (2) armed struggle.
32
  Although some mod-
ern scholars have focused on the individual spiritual element of jihad, 
throughout the lifetime of the Prophet and the vast majority of Islamic 
history, jihad referred to Islamic holy war, especially when related to is-
sues involving the non-Muslim world.
33
  This meaning of jihad is ex-
plained by Georgetown Professor of Islam John Esposito as follows: 
Those who wage war (jihad) for God engage in a religiopolitical act, a holy 
war.  The God who commands this struggle against oppression and unbelief 
                                                             
26 Id. at 9-11. 
27 Id. at 10. 
28 Id. at 6-9, 20-21. 
29 Id. at 11. 
30 BERNARD LEWIS, THE CRISIS OF ISLAM: HOLY WAR AND UNHOLY TERROR 6 
(2004). 
31 Id. 
32 Id., at 29-30. 
33 See id. at 30--31. 
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will assist His Muslim holy warriors. . . . These holy warriors (mujahidin) 
will be rewarded in this life with victory and the spoils of war.  Those who 
fall in battle will be rewarded with eternal life as martyrs (sahid, witness) 
for the faith.
34
 
Islamic law authorizes jihad for enemies classified as infidels and 
apostates, and is a religious obligation of all Muslims.
35
  While jihad will 
resurface again in contemporary discussions, it was Muhammad’s con-
quest of Mecca in 624 that constituted the first example of Islamic ji-
had.
36
  
The fight for Mecca commenced at the Battle of Badr in 624, where 
an outnumbered Muslim army traveled from Medina and defeated the 
army of the Meccan tribes.
37
  Subsequent battles determined the fate of 
Arabia from 625 to 630, but by 630 Muslims succeeded in overtaking 
Mecca and converting its people to Islam.
38
  From 630 until his death in 
632, Muhammad consolidated power over Arabia by spreading the Is-
lamic religion and implementing a successful system of taxation 
throughout the state.
39
  In 632, Muhammad participated in the pilgrimage 
from Medina to Mecca for the final time and gave his last sermon to the 
Islamic community.
40
  When Muhammad died later that year, he did so 
having achieved the once seemingly impossible objective of uniting the 
warring tribes of Arabia in the name of Islam.
41
   
B.  The Islamic State Following the Death of Muhammad – The 
“Rightly Guided Caliphs” 
Following the death of Muhammad a disagreement ensued in decid-
ing who should serve as the leader of the Islamic people.  A majority of 
Muslims believed that the head of the Islamic state, the caliph, should be 
chosen from the group of companions to Muhammad as selected by the 
leadership of the Prophet’s tribe, the Quraysh.
42
  A minority of Muslims, 
however, believed that only direct kin should follow in the line of suc-
                                                             
34
 THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra note 12, at 13-14. 
35 LEWIS, supra note 30, at 31-33. 
36 Id. at 33-34. 
37 THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra note 12, at 9. 
38 Id. at 10. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 10-11. 
41 Id. at 9-11. 
42 UNIV. OF PA., A Concise Summary of the Evolution of Islamic Law (Sharia) From 
its Inception to the Present (Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.upenn 
.edu/emeritus/IslamicLaw.pdf. 
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cession from the Prophet and that Ali (Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-
law who married his daughter Fatima) should be named the first caliph.
43
  
Ali, however, was passed over in favor of Muhammad’s long time fol-
lower Abu Bakr, selected in 632 to serve as the first caliph.
44
  The issues 
surrounding the leadership of Islam continually plagued the early Mus-
lim community and provided the foundation for the future sectarian divi-
sion between Sunni and Shiite (i.e. Shia) Muslims.
45
 
The historical analysis of the Islamic caliphate is divided into three 
distinct eras: (1) the “Rightly Guided Caliphs” (632-661), (2) the Umay-
yad Empire (661-750), and (3) the Abbasid Empire (750-1258).  The 
four Rightly Guided Caliphs – Abu Bakr (632-634), Umar ibn al-Khattab 
(634-644), Uthman ibn Affan (644-656), and Ali ibn Abi Talib (656-661) 
– were not only unique in the sense that they were all companions of 
Muhammad, but this era took on later significance in Sunni Islam as an 
idealized time period that all generations of Muslims should strive to 
emulate.  Abu Bakr, the first caliph, took leadership of the political and 
military authority of the state and gained significant prestige within the 
religious community, best exemplified by his leadership in Friday pray-
ers where Muslims venerated the name of the caliph.
46
  During Abu 
Bakr’s tenure as caliph he successfully repelled tribal rebellions precipi-
tated by the death of Muhammad and further consolidated Islamic au-
thority over the Arabian Peninsula.
47
         
The death of Abu Bakr in 634 led to the rise of his successor, Umar, 
an acclaimed military leader who commenced a period of territorial ex-
pansion.
48
  By 641, Umar presided over the rise of Islamic power 
through military endeavors into modern day Iraq, Syria, Palestine, and 
Egypt.  Islamic historian Karen Armstrong notes that the Muslim wars of 
expansion were not a “divine mandate to conquer the world” but rather a 
desire to further the national interests of the state that were advanced by 
a unified Islamic community.
49
  Upon his death in 644, Umar changed 
the methodology in the selection of his successor by appointing an elec-
tion committee to choose the next caliph.
50
  This process yielded the rise 
of Uthman, whose family was an opponent of Muhammad during his 
                                                             
43 Id. 
44 THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra note 12, at 36. 
45 Id. at 35-37. 
46 Id. at 36. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 KAREN ARMSTRONG, ISLAM: A SHORT HISTORY 27-30 (2002). 
50 THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra note 12, at 6. 
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lifetime, to become the third caliph.  Uthman’s reign was characterized 
by a lack of strong leadership and a rise in tribal factions, which eventu-
ally led to Uthman’s assassination in 656.
51
   
Uthman’s death facilitated Ali, supported by some Muslims to be-
come the first caliph instead of Abu Bakr, to now ascend to the position 
of the fourth caliph.
52
  To the partisan supporters of Ali, the first three 
caliphs were usurpers of power who did not possess a legitimate claim to 
succeed Muhammad as the leader of the Islamic community.  However, 
Ali came to power in 656 encumbered by two strong opposition move-
ments that were aggrieved by Ali’s failure to bring Caliph Uthman’s 
murderers to justice.
53
  These two separate challenges to Ali’s authority 
were respectively led by Aisha, Abu Bakr’s daughter, and Muawiyah, the 
Governor of Syria and nephew of Caliph Uthman.
54
  While Ali was able 
to withstand the rebellion of Aisha’s forces, the first time a caliph fought 
against another Muslim army, a more serious challenge was posed by 
Muawiyah.  Muawiyah refused to acknowledge the appointment made by 
Caliph Ali to replace him as the Syrian Governor and he withstood an 
attack by Ali in 657 to retain power.
55
  Upon the assassination of Ali in 
661, Muawiyah ascended to the position of caliph and proceeded to turn 
the Islamic empire into a familial monarchy.
56
          
C.  The Islamic Caliphate During the Umayyad Empire (661-750) 
The death of Ali and the rise of Muawiyah to caliph in 661 ended 
the era of the Rightly Guided Caliphs and marked the commencement of 
the Umayyad Empire.
57
  Under Muawiyah the seat of the caliphate was 
moved to Damascus and the bureaucratic and judicial spheres of the Is-
lamic empire were strengthened.
58
  Society in the Umayyad Empire was 
centered on the Arab military aristocracy which had already achieved an 
unprecedented expansion of the Islamic state.  By the time Muawiyah 
became caliph, Islam had spread to Egypt, Libya, the Fertile Crescent, 
Syria, Iraq, Persia, and the borders of Afghanistan.
59
  The expansionary 
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military conquests under the Umayyad Empire additionally led to Islamic 
control over the Mahgreb (North Africa), Spain, and Portugal.
60
  The 
purpose of these conquests was not to mandate the adherence of Islam to 
outsiders, but rather to bring those living in ignorance and unbelief (jahi-
liyyah) into Islam, as the Prophet himself did in Mecca during the Reve-
lation.
61
  Since the primary mission of Islam is to end jahiliyyah, jihad 
was justified by early Islamic jurists to spread the word of God so the 
will of God would be implemented on Earth.
62
        
D.  Important Developments During the Era of Expansion Under the 
Umayyad Empire 
Islamic jurisprudence during the Umayyad Empire guided the tra-
jectory of Islam through the development and implementation of Islamic 
law, Sharia.  The geographical growth of the Islamic caliphate under the 
Umayyad Empire required the advancement of a legal system that al-
lowed the centralized government in Damascus to exercise control over 
the far-away lands situated under its authority.  The Umayyad Empire 
witnessed the changing role of the qadi, or judge, who originally served 
as an arbitrator but evolved into a legal authority where the qadi looked 
to the Quran to come to legal decisions.
63
  One of the unique decisions of 
the Umayyad’s was to allow the qadi to use local customary law (‘urf) in 
making legal judgments, which facilitated great diversity in early Islamic 
jurisprudence.
64
  During this time the evolution of a class of Islamic reli-
gious scholars (ulama) built the body of Sharia through individual legal 
opinions known as fatwas.
65
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Two other important elements shaped the early years of Islamic po-
litical expansion and legal development: (1) the legal differentiation in 
Sharia between Christian and Muslim lands, and (2) reverence in the 
Quran for martyrdom.  As the Islamic empire spread, Islamic law stipu-
lated that it was a Muslim’s duty to commit jihad against those who re-
jected Muslim rule.
66
 John Esposito notes that verses in the Quran – now 
commonly referred to as the “sword verses” – were used by Islamic ju-
rists during the era of the early caliphs to support the permissible territo-
rial expansion of the empire through offensive jihad.
67
  To support the 
territorial interests of the Islamic state, leading Muslim jurists argued that 
later parts of the Quran abrogated early ones that restricted jihad only for 
defensive war.
68
   
 Individuals in lands conquered by the Islamic empire had a choice: 
they could either convert to Islam or consent to Muslim rule and retain 
their religion, albeit subjected to a tax.
69
  If they refused both options, 
however, they would be subject to prosecution.
70
  Islamic jurists devised 
the legal distinction between dar al-Islam (land of Islam) and dar al-
harb (land of war) and argued the duty of Muslims was to expand the dar 
al-Islam to allow the rest of the world to live in the Islamic political and 
social order designed by God.
71
  It must be noted that although subject to 
higher taxes and required not to violate Sharia, Jews and Christians were 
allowed to practice their religion freely and provided positive contribu-
tions to Islamic society under the rule of successive caliphs.
72
      
The second major development involves the reverence in the text of 
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the Quran for martyrdom.  John Esposito cites two verses in the Quran 
that clearly express support for martyrdom: “Were you to be killed or to 
die in the way of God, forgiveness and mercy from God are far better 
than what they amass” (3:157); and, “Never think that those who are 
killed in the way of God are dead.  They are alive with their Lord, well 
provided for.” (3:169).
73
  Hadith literature further affirmed Islamic rev-
erence for martyrdom by depicting the rewards for those that die a mar-
tyr, including being free of sin in the afterlife (and thus not being subject 
to an interrogation by angels), and going to one of the highest locations 
in heaven close to the Throne of God.
74
  Since the founding of Islam and 
the first jihad of the Meccan Arabs, martyrdom was valorized, and in 
many ways the culture of martyrdom was symbolic of the militant ex-
pansionary efforts of the Umayyads.
75
    
E. The Official Split Between Sunni and Shia During the Umayyad 
Empire 
After the death of Muawiyah in 680, his son Yazid was named ca-
liph and inherited a challenge to his power posed by the resurgence of 
the followers of Ali, now led by his son Husayn.
76
  Husayn, who long-
refused the validity of the Umayyad caliphate that rose to power follow-
ing the death of his father, maintained political support among ethnic 
Persians who rejected the Arab-dominated Umayyad Empire.
77
  Caliph 
Yazid attempted to quash the Husayn-led rebels by sending his army to 
fight, however they were surprisingly met with strong resistance.
78
   
As accounted in Shia tradition, Husayn and his troops withstood six 
days of attacks until they were cut from their water supply which forced 
an imminent confrontation.
79
   Husayn and his outnumbered forces 
charged Yazid’s army but were massacred on the field of battle, becom-
ing martyrs for their beliefs.
80
  The distinction in Islam between Sunni 
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(the vast majority of Muslims who continued to support the Umayyad 
Empire and believed that the torch of Islam should be passed by the trib-
al elders) and Shia (the minority of Muslims who followed Ali and be-
lieved that the leaders of Islam should be based on the Prophet’s familial 
relations) was cemented by this battle and led to the development of dis-
tinct religious, legal, and cultural practices within the two sects.
81
  Con-
temporary Shia expert Vali Nasr analogizes the Sunni-Shia split to that 
of the Protestants and Catholics in Western Christianity, noting, “[J]ust 
as past intra-Christian politics shaped European politics, so the Sunni-
Shia conflict continues to shape the history of the Islamic world and the 
broader Middle East.”
82
  
The ability of the Umayyad Empire to withstand the specter of re-
volt did not last long and by 720, various ethnic and tribal groups signifi-
cantly challenged the ruling authority.
83
  One notable faction consisted of 
pious Muslims from diverse ethnic backgrounds, who claimed the 
Umayyad Empire was departing from the Islamic way of life, condemn-
ing the policies of the Umayyads as “un-Islamic innovations.”
84
  In 747, 
a rebel group supported a freed Abbasid slave named Abu Muslim to 
lead the opposition against the Umayyads.
85
  Backed by support from the 
Shia community, the rebellion led to the fall of the Umayyad Empire and 
in 750, Abu al-Abbas was named the first caliph of the Abbasid Em-
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pire.
86
 
F. The Apex and Decline of the Islamic Caliphate under the Abbasid 
Empire (750-1258) 
Once Abu al-Abbas was named caliph in 750, the capital was 
moved from Damascus to Baghdad, which commenced an era of further 
cultural, economic, and legal development.
87
   As caliph, al-Abbas’ first 
order was the consolidation of power, which entailed decimating the 
same Shia community that provided critical support in helping to over-
throw the Umayyad Empire.
88
  While this further strained relations be-
tween the Sunni and Shia, the Abbasid Empire ruled in the name of Sun-
ni Islam and heavily invested in the development of Islamic scholars 
(ulama) that provided the next wave of Islamic jurisprudence.  One criti-
cism levied by the Abbasids on the Umayyad Empire was that they failed 
to develop a fully integrated Islamic legal system, which led to strong 
Abbasid support for Islamic legal scholarship.
89
  As a result, mosques 
and academies of learning (madrassas) were established and research on 
the Quran and the traditions of the Prophet, the foundation upon which 
Islamic law is built, greatly expanded.
90
  Consequentially, unlike the 
Umayyad Empire, the Abbasids ceased using a local-based approach to 
Islamic law and moved towards a more streamlined jurisprudence with 
an elevated role for the ulama.
91
    
Western history remembers the Abbasid Empire (750-1258) best for 
its great economic and cultural advancements, later viewed as the golden 
age of the Islamic civilization.
92
  The linguistic hegemony of the Arabic 
language in the extensive Abbasid territories facilitated greater commu-
nication over a wide geographical mass and thus became the language of 
choice for international academics and businessmen.
93
  Islamic study of 
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philosophy and science produced great achievements in preserving the 
teachings of ancient Greek philosophy while the mathematical fields of 
algebra and geometry also witnessed substantial growth.
94
  Islamic inno-
vation helped move forward the burgeoning fields of chemistry, pharma-
cology, and veterinary science which in turn facilitated the growth of 
medical schools and hospitals.
95
  Lastly, the period represented a renais-
sance in Islamic art and architecture, both of which remain vivid in the 
unique geometrical designs and wood carvings expressed in the many 
great Mosques constructed during the time period.
96
  In a comparative 
perspective, the vibrancy of the Islamic world – espoused by its thriving 
cities such as Spanish Cordoba and Baghdad – stood in stark contrast to 
the simultaneous developments seen in the war-torn Dark Ages of Euro-
pean Christendom.
97
  
The Abbasid Empire was unable to maintain sufficient governmen-
tal authority over its vast territory, however, and by the turn of the tenth 
century an era marred by rebellion and decline began.
98
  While the level 
of cultural and scholarly achievement remained high throughout the en-
tire Abbasid period, two groups gained control over the caliphate: the 
Buyids (945-1055), a Persian Shia dynasty, and the Seljuks (1055-1258), 
a Turkish Sunni dynasty.
99
  Both of these military regimes presided over 
a deteriorating political unity, and although an Abbasid was selected to 
the position of caliph to preserve the unification of the empire, the real 
decision making powers were now vested in a military ruler known as 
the sultan.
100
   
The ascent of the Buyids in the ninth century represented a brief de-
cline in Arab influence within the Islamic state, replaced by a resurgence 
of Shia power and the re-emergence of Persian language and literature 
(this is sometimes labeled the “Iranian Intermezzo” in Middle Eastern 
history).
101
  However, a competing, more extremist Shia state known as 
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the Fatimid caliphate was also enthroned in 908, and its influence in 
Egypt, Syria, and western Arabia challenged the power of the Abbas-
ids.
102
  The Seljuks seizure of the Abbasid caliphate from the Buyids in 
1055 marked the growing Turkish influence in the Islamic world, and by 
1079 the lands of Syria and Palestine were reclaimed by the Abbasids 
from a weakened Fatimid caliphate.
103
  Notably, the Seljuks had returned 
the caliphate back to Sunni Muslim control and for a short time success-
fully reasserted authority over the Abbasid Empire.
104
  It was not to last 
though, as the commencement of the Crusades soon posed significant 
challenges to the interests of the Seljuk-led Abbasid caliphate.
105
 
The Crusades (1095-1453) began when the Abbasid Seljuk army 
defeated the Christian army of the Byzantine Empire, and, in response, 
Byzantine Emperor Alexius I called on a unification of Christendom to 
fight the “infidel” Islamic state and liberate Jerusalem from Muslim 
rule.
106
  Although the centuries-long Crusades were based on political 
and military interests, the religious appeal of the battle drew support 
from the Christian masses throughout Western Europe.
107
  Since 638 the 
Islamic empire ruled over Jerusalem, but still provided significant rights 
to Jews and Christians while in power.
108
  The success of the First Cru-
sade brought Jerusalem back into Byzantine control in 1099, but the bru-
tality employed by the Christian forces was remembered by future gener-
ations of Muslims as a means of cultivating anti-Christian sentiment:
109
 
the attack by the Christian forces left no Muslim survivors and disre-
spectfully used the Islamic holy sites of the Dome of the Rock and the al-
Aqsa mosque.
110
  Bernard Lewis notes that although the events of the 
First Crusade are cited by modern Islamists as an injustice by the Chris-
tians – as stated in the contemporary rhetoric of Osama Bin Laden – the 
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historical record suggests that at the time the Islamic empire was indif-
ferent to the loss of Jerusalem to the Crusaders.
111
          
Christian rule over Jerusalem following the First Crusade did not 
last long, however, and in 1187 the famed Islamic military leader Saladin 
led the effort to recapture the city and return it to Islamic possession.
112
  
In response to the provocations of Reynald of Chatllion, a Crusader mili-
tary leader who engaged in attacks on both Muslim caravans near the Is-
lamic holy place of the Hijaz and pilgrims headed towards Mecca, Sala-
din proclaimed jihad against the Crusaders and Jerusalem was re-
conquered by his army.
113
  Modern Islamic history, and in particular Is-
lamist movements, make special note of the treatment of Jews and Chris-
tians under the new Muslim authority: in juxtaposition to the massacre of 
Muslims during the First Crusade, most prisoners of war captured by 
Saladin were later granted freedom.
114
  The individual responsible for 
insulting the Islamic Holy Land was not granted such leniency, however, 
as Saladin beheaded Reynald himself.
115
  
By the thirteenth century, political and religious factions within the 
vast territory of the Abbasid Empire left it weak and vulnerable to attack 
from outsiders.
116
  Following the successful conquests of Genghis 
Khan’s Mongol Empire throughout Central Asia, China, and Russia, in 
1258 the Abbasid caliphate found itself subjected to the same fate.
117
  
When the grandson of Ghengis Kahn, Hulagu Kahn, eviscerated the capi-
tal of Baghdad and executed the caliph and his family, the reign of the 
Abbasid caliphate officially ended.
118
  Out of the vestiges of the Abbasid 
Empire, only Egypt and Syria were able to withstand the Mongol forces, 
which led to the creation of a separate state known as the Mamluk sul-
tanate.
119
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III. THE FALL, RISE, AND FALL (AGAIN) OF ISLAMIC POWER AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS (1258 – 1979)   
Although the end of the Abbasid caliphate might have foreshad-
owed the imminent decline of Islamic political and religious influence in 
the centuries that followed, such dire prognostications never material-
ized.  The emergence of three distinct Islamic empires in the fifteenth 
and sixteenth centuries,
120
 each rivaling the other for political power, af-
firmed the lasting influence of Islam throughout the Middle East and 
Eastern world.
121
  However, a growing number of Muslims believed Is-
lamic leaders veered from the true path of Islam, and calls for a return to 
classical Islamic teachings became increasingly pronounced.   
A. The Ideology of Ibn Taymiyya, the First Islamic Revivalist 
While the ideas of Ibn Taymiyya (1268-1328) originated many cen-
turies ago, his work still resonates in the modern era and endures a spe-
cial reverence among militant Islamists, including Osama Bin Laden.
122
  
Upon the Mongol defeat of the Abbasid Empire, a once unfathomable 
prospect, Taymiyya was forced to leave his home in Damascus and 
thereafter held a lifetime animus against the Mongols.
123
  Taymiyya ar-
gued for the return to a textualist interpretation of the Quran and sunna to 
purify the Islamic religion and its people, and believed in emulating the 
teachings of the original Islamic community during the time of Muham-
mad.
124
  John Esposito summarizes Taymiyya’s message: 
A return to pristine purity of the period of Muhammad and the First Four 
Righteous Caliphs, he believed, was necessary to restore the Islamic com-
munity’s power and greatness.  He distinguished between Islam and non-
Islam (the dar al-Islam and dar al-harb), the lands of belief and unbe-
lief.
125
 
Although the Mongol King had recently converted to Islam, Tay-
miyya justified jihad against the Mongols because of their continued at-
tacks against the Muslim Mamluk rulers in Egypt and their failure to im-
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plement the true interpretation of Sharia.
126
   
As a professor of Sunni law in the conservative Hanabali school of 
Islamic jurisprudence, Taymiyya was unique in that he served as both an 
Islamic legal scholar and political activist.
127
  Contemporary analyst 
Sean Wilson explains: 
Critical to understanding Al-Qaeda’s jihad is Taymiyya’s notion of takfir.  
Taymiyya believed that Muslims who failed to follow the path of the salaf 
(the values and practices of the prophet and his companions) were apostates 
and enemies of Islam.  Takfir was a means of excommunicating unfaithful 
Muslims.  According to Taymiyya, there could not be peace between the 
kafir (infidels) and Muslims.  It was every Muslim’s duty through jihad to 
force the kafirs to see the true path of Islam.
128
 
Although Taymiyya’s ideas failed to gain momentum during his 
lifetime – in fact, his teachings led to his eventual imprisonment – his 
views played a considerable role in the growth of Islamist ideologies that 
spawned during the eighteenth and twentieth centuries.
129
 
B. The Three Post-Abbasid Islamic Empires: The Ottomans, Safavids, 
and Mongols 
Global Islamic political power arguably reached an apex in the six-
teenth century during the reign of three separate Muslim empires that 
competed with each other for regional geo-political influence.
130
  The 
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With Cairo in disarray, Ottoman armies moved as far south as Mamluk-controlled Syria.  
Hoping to repel the Ottomans, cavalrymen raced from Egypt to Syria, but Ottoman can-
ons overpowered the prideful Mamluks, who rejected gunpowder as a “weak man’s 
weapon.”  Continuing south into Egypt, Ottoman firepower dealt the final deathblow, as 
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Turkish Ottoman Empire (1492-1918), the Safavid Dynasty of Persia 
(1500-1779), and the Mongols of India (1526-1730)
131
 provided the cata-
lyst for another era of political and cultural advancement within Islam.
132
  
While all three empires maintained distinct cultural and religious identi-
ties, each respectively developed stronger bonds between the state and 
Islamic institutions than during the Abbasid period: the Ottoman Empire 
codified Sunni Sharia, the Safavid Persians incorporated Shiism as the 
official religion of the state, and the Mongols were heavily influenced by 
a small sect of Islam known as Sufism.
133
        
The Ottoman Empire developed out of the vacuum of power left by 
the successors of Genghis Kahn and maintained a proud Mongol-Turkish 
tradition that fused militancy and a strong connection to classical Is-
lam.
134
  The Ottomans were the primary flag bearers of the Islamic ca-
liphal tradition and the most prominent representatives of Islam to the 
outside world in the West.
135
  Under the leadership of the sultan – given 
names such as “Warrior of the Faith” and “Defender of the Sharia” – the 
Ottomans extended their dominance over the Arab Middle East and 
North Africa.
136
  Subsequent Ottoman military victories also led to the 
incorporation of Greece, Cyprus, the Balkans, and the majority of East-
ern Europe.
137
   
Although efforts to further the Ottoman’s expansionist jihad were 
kept in check by the victories of both Mediterranean Christians in 1580 
                                                                                                                                        
the Mamluks were overrun outside Cairo in 1517.”). 
131 Martin, supra note 90, at 84-85. 
132 THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra note 12, at 60-61. 
133 ARMSTRONG, supra note 49, at 115-116; see THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra note 12, 
at 100-03 ( noting that Sufism is a minority branch of Islam that is not discussed in this 
paper because it is largely peripheral to the contemporary issues surrounding the Islamist 
ideology and Al-Qaeda.  For more information on Sufism, Esposito provides succinct 
analysis.). 
134 THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra note 12, at 61. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id.; see Bernard Lewis, The Ottoman Empire and Its Aftermath, 15 J. CONTEMP. 
HIST. 27 (1980) (“Islam was the traditional basis of the Ottoman state as of virtually all 
other states in the classical Islamic world. . . . The polity was conceived as the Communi-
ty of Muslims, its head as the successor of the Sultans and Caliphs of the glorious past 
and as the holder of an Islamic sovereignty dedicated to the maintenance of Islam and the 
extension of its domain.”); Rogerson, supra note 82, at 355 (“Later generations of Otto-
man sultans would be acknowledged as the greatest rulers of the Muslim world, though 
their claim to the Caliphate emerged only in 1774 from the chance wording of a treaty 
with Russia.  As an exclusively Turkish dynasty without a drop of Arab blood, let alone 
that of Prophet Muhammad, the Ottomans’ claim to the Caliphate was not always accept-
ed outside their own wide domains”). 
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and Eastern Europeans in Vienna in 1683, the Ottoman Empire nonethe-
less buttressed a return of Islamic artistic and scholarly achievements last 
seen during the Abbasid period.
138
  The Ottomans found great prosperity 
under the sultanate of Suleiman al-Qanuni (1520-1566), known as “the 
Lawgiver,” who declared Sharia the official law throughout the empire 
and employed judges (qadi), Islamic legal advisors (muftis), and teachers 
in schools (madrassas) as agents of the state.
139
  By the sixteenth centu-
ry, however, the Ottoman grip on regional hegemony was challenged by 
the emergence of the two other rival Muslim empires: the Safavid Dyn-
asty (in modern Iran) and the Mongol Empire (in the Indian subconti-
nent).
140
 
The ethnically Persian and religiously Shiite Safavid Dynasty 
(1500-1779) came to power following the collapse of the Persian Em-
pire, the historical link between Shia Islam and the modern state of 
Iran.
141
  The first Safavid ruler, Isamail, claimed religious legitimacy 
when he linked his bloodline to the twelfth (hidden) imam and declared 
himself shah, the religious and political leader of the Shia state.
142
  
While the Sunni Ottomans and Shia Safavids fought many wars for re-
gional hegemony, Safavid culture and scholarship thrived.  Like the Ot-
tomans, the Safavids produced works of magnificent architecture and 
oversaw the expansion of Shia jurisprudence.
143
   
The third Islamic power of the era, the Indian Mongol Dynasty 
(1526-1730), was a Sunni Muslim state which, through its power base in 
the city of Delhi, successfully ruled over a majority Hindu population.
144
  
Not to be outdone by their neighboring Islamic rivals, the Mongols 
thrived in architecture and the arts, engineering the construction of the 
grand Taj Mahal and fusing the Ottoman and Persian traditions of artistic 
design in celebrated paintings.  However, as the modern European na-
tion-state system developed in the aftermath of the sectarian religious 
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wars of the Christian Dark Ages, an era of unprecedented European eco-
nomic and political modernization commenced.  Importantly, the ad-
vancements in Western Europe soon left the three Islamic empires in 
significant comparative decline.
145
 
C. The Ascent of Islamic Revivalist Movements: The Rise of 
Wahhabism in Arabia 
On the precipice of the rapid decline in the power of the Islamic 
empires, some traditionalist Arabian Muslims gained momentum in their 
objective to effectuate a return to classical practices and teachings of Is-
lam.  Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, an Islamic legal theologian who 
ascribed to the ideas of Ibn Taymiyya and identified with the conserva-
tive Hanabali school, became the primary revivalist of the early eight-
eenth century.
146
  Al-Wahhab, like Taymiyya before him, believed that 
the Islamic nation was living in a state of ignorance (jahiliyyah) similar 
to the Meccan community during the time of Muhammad.
147
      
The developing political weakness of the Islamic states, to al-
Wahhab, directly correlated to the deviation from classical Islamic prac-
tices.  However, al-Wahhab preached that if Muslims began to live in ac-
cordance with life as it was during the time of the Prophet, as expressed 
in the Quran and sunna, prosperity would return to the Islamic people.
148
  
As John Esposito explains:  
For Ibn abd al-Wahhab . . . . [a]ll subsequent, post-Prophetic developments 
and the time-honored interpretations of the ulama and the law schools were 
subject to review and reevaluation in the light of Islam’s fundamental 
sources.  The purpose of ijtihad was a return to a purified Islam by weeding 
out those un-Islamic beliefs and practices that had infiltrated the law and 
life of Muslims. . . . For Abd al-Wahhab, the Islamic way of life was to be 
found in pure, unadulterated form in the seventh-century community.
149
 
In 1765 al-Wahhab joined forces with Muhammad ibn Saud, a 
widely influential local tribal chief, and together they united factions in 
Arabia to implement their purist vision of Islam, thereafter known as the 
Wahhabi movement.
150
  The lasting influence of al-Wahhab proved sig-
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nificant in shaping the growth of offspring ideologies in Africa and India, 
and to this day Wahabbi principles remain central to Saudi Arabia’s 
modern application of Sharia.
151
   
D. The Decline and Collapse of the Islamic Empires and the Rise of 
European Colonialism 
The eighteenth century witnessed the deterioration of the three great 
Muslim empires, and unlike declines of the previous Islamic regimes, a 
resurgence of Islamic power never materialized.
152
  The downward spiral 
of the Islamic empires – all built largely on agriculturally dominated 
economic programs – coincided with the Europeans unprecedented tech-
nological innovations in science, education, and industry that facilitated 
widespread commercial enterprise and an overall increase in the Europe-
an quality of life.
153
  As Bernard Lewis details: 
In the Middle Ages Europe had little to offer to the far more advanced and 
sophisticated societies of Islam. . . . [Islam] was immunized against any-
thing coming from Christendom – that is to say, from a society which, ac-
cording to the Muslim perception, represented an earlier and outdated stage 
of the religious civilization of which Islam represented the final perfection. 
. . . Such major movements as the Renaissance, the Reformation, the En-
                                                                                                                                        
included: “God clothed Himself in a human form; he rejected the intercessory prayer of 
saints and expressions of reverence for the dead; and he demanded that Muslim men re-
fuse to trim their beards.  He banned holidays, even the Prophet’s birthday, and his fol-
lowers destroyed many of the holy sites, which he considered idols.  He attacked the arts 
as being frivolous and dangerous.  He gave a warrant to his followers that they could kill 
or rape or plunder those who refused to follow his injunctions.”). 
151 THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra. note 11, at 119; see ASLAN, supra note 142, at 246 
(noting the influence of Wahabbism in the subsequent development of Islamist organiza-
tions: “Thanks to Saudi evangelism, Wahhabi doctrine has dramatically affected the 
religio-political ideologies of the Muslim Brothers, Mawdudi’s Islamic Association, the 
Palestinian Hamas, and Islamic Jihad, to name only a few groups.  The Saudis have be-
come the patrons of a new kind of Pan-Islamism: one based on the austere, uncompro-
mising, and extremist ideology of Islamic fundamentalism, which has become a powerful 
voice in deciding the future of the Islamic state.”). 
152 ARMSTRONG, supra note 49, at 137-38; see Ira Lapidus, Islamic Revival and Mo-
dernity: The Contemporary Movements and the Historical Paradigms, 40 J. ECON. & 
SOC. HIST. ORIENT 444, 449-50 (1997) (“In the course of the 18th century Islamic regimes 
everywhere collapsed or were in decline. The Safavid dynasty which had ruled Iran since 
1500 was destroyed by Afghan and other tribal forces. The Ottoman Empire was in 
course of disaggregation as . . . notables established their locally based authority and 
small scale independent governments.  Mongol suzerainty, challenged in the 18th century 
by Sikh, Maratha, and other provincial separatist movements, and by the rise of British 
power in Bengal, gave way to British paramountcy and was liquidated altogether after the 
Mutiny of 1857.”). 
153 ARMSTRONG, supra note 49, at 142-43. 
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lightenment, and the Scientific Revolution passed unnoticed and without 
effect. . . . There was no response to the European Renaissance, and no 
Reformation.  All these ideas and others that followed them were seen as 
Christian and discounted accordingly.
154
   
European capitalism furthered the economic expansion and domi-
nance of trade by the great powers of Christendom.  It was not until the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that the Islamic empires even real-
ized the magnitude of the threat posed by the increasingly powerful Eu-
ropean states.
155
  Accordingly, during the mid-nineteenth century the 
mercantilist objectives of the new world powers were fulfilled: the Euro-
pean and Eastern nations colonized a significant portion of the Islamic 
world and forced economic modernization to further their own financial 
interests.
156
 
E. The Response of the Trilogy of Islamic Reformers: Al-Afghani, 
‘Abduh, and Rida 
The encroachment of Western European powers into Muslim lands 
– the first experience of Islam as politically and economically subservi-
ent to Christian states – facilitated a resurgence in Islamic revivalism 
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erties, human rights, and, to a far lesser degree, democracy – the wonderful legacy of the 
Enlightenment that had taken hundreds of years to evolve in Europe – were pressed upon 
the colonized lands with no attempt to render them in terms the indigenous population 
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increased production.  New cities were built instead of old cities being developed.  
Cheaply manufactured imports destroyed most local industries, and native markets had 
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ers.  In return for the pillaging of their lands, the suppression of their independence, and 
the destruction of their local economies, the colonized peoples were to be given the gift 
of civilization.”). 
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throughout the nineteenth century.
157
  One of the leading revivalists was 
Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani (1838-1897) of Cairo who maintained influence 
throughout the ideologically disparate Islamic territories and even parts 
of Western Europe.
158
  Paradoxically, Al-Afghani respected Western 
reasoning but diverged from most other Ottoman reformers who support-
ed the liberalization and the adoption of Western education, science, and 
religious secularization as a means of catching up with centuries of Eu-
ropean advancements.
159
  John Esposito notes that in rejecting the doc-
trine of Western liberalism and secularization, Al-Afghani’s ideas for re-
form were based on two main principles: “(1) Islam is a comprehensive 
way of life, encompassing worship, law, government, society; (2) the 
true Muslim struggles to carry out God’s will in history, and thus seeks 
success in this life as well as the next.”
160
  Thus, to Al-Afghani reform 
did not mean Western liberalization, but rather a glorified return to the 
practices and teachings of the early Muslim tradition.  An implementa-
tion of classical Islamic practices, Al-Afghani argued, would facilitate 
the re-emergence of the glorious cultural and intellectual achievements 
experienced by the Islamic civilization in previous centuries.
161
       
Al-Afgani served as a harsh critic of the state-backed Islamic jurists, 
the ulama, and supported the purification of Islam through ijtihad (rein-
terpretation) of Sharia, a method of legal interpretation cited by Taymiy-
ya and implemented in the preceding century by the followers of Al-
Wahhab in Arabia.  Moreover, Al-Afghani played a formative role in the 
development of pan-Islamism, a movement that fused Muslim national-
ism with anti-colonial sentiment and found popular support within the 
larger Islamic community.  In particular, Al-Afghani’s anti-colonial doc-
trine led him to support constricting the power of Islamic rulers through 
constitutionalism and parliamentary government, which endeared him to 
a generation of Muslim youth.  The teachings of the widely influential 
Al-Afghani heavily influenced Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Rida, his 
prized students who became the trailblazers of the next generation of Is-
lamic reformers.
162
 
Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905) was long considered the favorite 
pupil of Al-Afghani and heir to his ideological tradition: the two collabo-
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rated together in publications and ‘Abduh joined his mentor when he was 
forced into exile in Paris following an unsuccessful nationalist upris-
ing.
163
  When ‘Abduh returned to Egypt, however, he became a lauded 
Islamic jurist within the ulama and obtained the most prominent status of 
Grand Mufti, the head judge presiding over the entire Sharia court sys-
tem in Egypt.  In diverging from some of the positions of his teacher Al-
Afghani, ‘Abduh argued that Islam and science were not inherently at 
odds with each other, believing that the decline of Islam was precipitated 
by both un-Islamic practices and a misplaced rigidity with which the 
ulama interpreted Sharia.
164
  Like his ideological predecessors ‘Abduh 
supported the practice of private reinterpretation (ijtihad)
165
, but unlike 
previous revivalists he provided an important distinction between fun-
damental unchanging truths in Islam and other lesser values that could 
shift in accordance with the passage of time.
166
  In that same vein, ‘Ab-
duh became a pioneering reformer who effectuated liberal reforms at the 
prominent Egyptian al-Azhar University, where he increased female ed-
ucational opportunities and also criticized the negative impact of polyg-
amy in the Muslim world.
167
   
Over the course of the early twentieth century the teachings of ‘Ab-
duh were used to defend two competing objectives: liberal reformers 
supported the secularization of Islam justified by ‘Abduh’s progressive 
tendencies, while Islamists emphasized ‘Abduh’s teachings to follow the 
path of the aslaf, the uncorrupted and pure early followers of Islam.
168
  
Although ‘Abduh became known as “the Father of Islamic Modernism in 
the Arab World,” following his death, his protégé Rashid Rida carried 
the mantle of the Afghani-Abduh tradition, but then returned it toward 
the more conservative and militant sphere of revivalist teachings.
169
   
Rashid Rida (1865-1935) believed the triumphs of early Muslims 
were God’s reward for his faithful followers and blamed current devia-
tions from the true practice of Islam on three factors: (1) imperial intru-
sions of the Europeans, (2) Western philosophy, and (3) the influence of 
Shiite Muslims.
170
  Furthermore, like his predecessors, Rida contended 
that state-sponsored Islamic scholars were unable to bring the Islamic 
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community in line with the traditions and values of early Islam.
171
  Rida 
affirmed the position of Al-Afghani, who first posited the pan-Islamic 
argument that the unification of the Islamic community would only be 
facilitated by the restoration of the Islamic caliphate and implementation 
of classical Sharia.
172
   
Like Afghani and ‘Abduh, Rida was motivated by celebrated re-
vivalist influences – the doctrine of the conservative Sunni Hanabali 
school, Ibn Taymiyya, and the Wahabbi movement – and became in-
creasingly Islamist throughout his lifetime.  The impact of World War I 
on the Muslim world led Rida to increasingly speak out against modern-
ism, which he believed would lead to the Western secularization of Is-
lam.  Rida’s views against modernity added a strong anti-Western ele-
ment to the Islamist ideology, and were reinforced by the Muslim 
Brotherhood and other like-minded organizations with a greater intensity 
in the years that followed.
173
                 
F. World Wars I and II and the Shaping of the Modern Islamic World 
The start of World War I in 1914 represented the culmination of 
centuries of decline in Islamic power relative to the growing influence of 
the West.  Moreover, it was the aftermath of World War I that upended 
the political and religious order that had existed during the previous four 
centuries in the Islamic world.
174
  In 1914, the Ottomans aligned with 
imperial Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, joining a military 
alliance known as the Central Powers.  Upon the defeat of the Central 
Powers, the victorious Allied powers of England, France, and Russia 
oversaw the international post-war environment that gave rise to three 
important developments in the Islamic world: (1) the disintegration of the 
Ottoman Empire and the subsequent creation of a secular Turkish state, 
(2) the creation of the modern state of Iran in the land of Persia, and (3) 
the official recognition of statehood for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
175
  
First, out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire’s collapse in 1919 
came the rise of Kemal Ataturk in Turkey, who implemented an unprec-
edented program of economic modernization and religious seculariza-
tion, which officially separated Islam from the governance of the state.
176
  
                                                             
171 Id. at 72-73. 
172 THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra note 12, at 133. 
173 Id. at 132-134.   
174 LEWIS, supra note 101, at 342. 
175 RAJ BHALA, UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW 250 (2011). 
176 LEWIS, supra note 101, at 345-46. 
346 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION [Vol.  3::10 
Second, the Eastern lands of the now-defunct Persian Empire became 
ruled by the dictatorship of Reza Khan, who seized power and pro-
claimed himself shah of Iran in 1925.
177
  Although Reza Shah consoli-
dated power and implemented an economic modernization program, un-
like Ataturk he did not denounce or disentangle the roots of Shia Islam 
within the state or in Iranian civil society.  Third, in 1924 ‘Abd al-‘Aziz 
ibn Saud, the leading descendant of the Saudi tradition that embraced the 
Wahhabi ideology, gained control over the Arabian holy lands of Mecca 
and Medina (previously held by the Turks) and cemented his power with 
the formal recognition of statehood for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 
1932.
178
   
Notably, the increased immigration of Eastern European Jewry to 
Palestine due to the rise of religious persecution throughout Europe fol-
lowing World War I furthered the momentum of the Jewish Zionist 
movement.  The 1917 Balfour Declaration, which proclaimed British 
support for the creation of a “National Home for the Jews,” was of sig-
nificance in the Islamic world because Britain maintained administrative 
control over Palestine’s majority Muslim population and the prospect of 
a Jewish state in Palestine potentially challenged Islamic interests.
179
  
Concurrently, there was a backlash in parts of the Islamic world in re-
sponse to the economic and religious modernization programs imple-
mented by mostly pro-Western Muslim leaders and a small percentage of 
the population that formed the aristocratic elite.
180
   
The ideological fusion of ardent nationalism with fascist rule by the 
Italian and German governments in the inter-war years (1918-1939) at-
tracted substantial Arab support, particularly for Nazi Germany.  Nota-
bly, the Nazis cultivated the favor of Muslims through anti-Semitic prop-
aganda promoted throughout the Middle East.  As World War II (1939-
1945) progressed, the Islamic territories were again turned into a battle-
ground for the conflict between the great world powers, this time in the 
form of the bifurcated alignment between the Allied (U.S., Britain, and 
the recently established Soviet Union) and Axis (German, Italy, and Ja-
pan) forces.  The success of the Allies in the War was followed by West-
ern occupation of Islamic lands, and some elements of the colonial order 
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remained, such as the British in India and the French in North Africa.
181
 
G. The New Islamists: Hasan al-Banna and Mawlanda Ala Mawdudi 
The creation of two early twentieth century Islamist organizations, 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (led by Hasan al-Banna), and Jamaat-
i-Islami in India (led by Mawlanda Ala Mawdudi), highlighted the rising 
influence of mainstream Islamist movements that merged anti-imperial 
sentiment with revivalist calls for a return to classical Sharia.
182
  Both 
groups developed in part as a reaction against British colonial influence 
and contained a message that rejected all Western elements of life, in-
cluding science and technology as well as social elements such as music 
and dress.
183
  Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-i-Islami 
promulgated the view that modern Muslim society was plagued by igno-
rance (jahiliyya), which could only be remedied through the practice of 
reinterpretation (ijtihad).
184
   
The messages of both groups resonated beyond the working class 
and found support among civil servants and educated professionals, as 
membership in the Muslim Brotherhood peaked somewhere between five 
hundred thousand to one million members.  Although supportive of pan-
Islamic values that called for the creation of a unified Muslim nation-
state, the impact of al-Banna’s Muslim Brotherhood and Mawdudi’s Ja-
maat-i-Islami was primarily felt in local political efforts in Egypt and 
pre-partitioned Indian Pakistan, respectively.  The lasting ideological and 
organizational influence of both groups was affirmed during the latter 
half of the twentieth century when both movements spread throughout 
the larger Islamic world: the Muslim Brotherhood continued to grow 
throughout Sudan, Syria, Jordan, Palestine, and Kuwait, while Jamaat-i-
Islami expanded to India, Afghanistan, Kashmir and Pakistan.
185
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H. The Long-Term Impact of the Post-War Era in the Islamic 
Heartland  
The end of the World War era (1914-1945) resulted in seismic 
change in the geo-political landscape of the Middle East, which emanat-
ed from the protracted withdrawal of Western imperialist powers from 
the region.  The end of the former colonial authorities led to the creation 
of independent nation-states throughout the Islamic world over the 
course of four decades.  As Bernard Lewis summarizes:  
In the aftermath of the First World War, three states in the region, Turkey, 
Iran, and Afghanistan, possessed full sovereign independence and had 
lengthy experience in exercising it.  The inter-war period added four Arab 
states, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iraq and Egypt . . . .The enforced departure of 
France from the Levant added Syria and Lebanon to the roster of Arab sov-
ereign states.  The League of Arab States was formed in March 1945 . . . . 
A year later . . . Jordan also gained independence.
186
 
Along with the many Arab nations granted statehood during this pe-
riod, 1948 marked the end of the British mandate over Palestine, which 
led to the creation of the Jewish state of Israel.  In addition, from an eco-
nomic perspective, technological innovations during the World War era 
witnessed the increased reliance of the major economies on petroleum, a 
commodity of abundant supply in the lands of the Middle East.  While 
the Western powers used their political influence to facilitate advanta-
geous deals for oil, the 1950’s and early 1960’s also saw the further dis-
engagement of Western imperialism that led to the independence of an 
array of Arab states: Libya, the Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritania, 
Kuwait, Algeria, and South Yemen.
187
    
                                                                                                                                        
the Koran and in the practice of solidarity and mutual help according to the maxim that 
all believers are brethren.  The Muslim Brotherhood obviously answered a crying need, 
for during the 1930s it grew by leaps and bounds; it established an extensive network of 
branches and of co-operative enterprises and its teaching found [favor] not only among 
the poor and the illiterate, but also, increasingly, among the educated and within the pro-
fessions.  It was what may be called a grass-roots movement, in that it was neither the 
outcome of official action, patronage, or inspiration, nor was it indebted in any way to the 
Westernized political leaders who played the political game in Cairo.”).  
186 LEWIS, supra note 101, at 357. 
187 Id. at 352, 358; see James Risen, Secrets of History: The C.I.A. In Iran, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 16, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/Mideast/04 1600iran-cia-
chapter1.html. (The Iranian Parliament, under the leadership of Prime Minister Moham-
med Mossadegh, voted in 1951 to nationalize the oil industry which coincided with the 
concurrent resurgence of the Communist party.   In response, in 1953 British and Ameri-
can operatives worked together to remove Mossadegh from office and restore the authori-
tative power of the Shah, who subsequently reinforced Western friendly oil agreements.  
Risen provides an accurate summation of the historical record of the American involve-
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I. Egyptian Politics and the Suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood 
under Nasser 
In July 1952 Gamal Abd-al Nasser rose to power by overthrowing 
the Egyptian monarchy with the aid of the Muslim Brotherhood, which 
appeared to signal an end to a century of Western-styled development in 
Egypt.
188
  However, in seeking to consolidate power and expand his in-
fluence to the larger Arab world, instead of implementing Sharia (as was 
expected), Nasser devised a distinct program of nationalist Arab social-
ism.  Nasserism, as it came to be known, was marked by state control of 
Islamic courts and Al-Azhar University, the influential Islamic center of 
learning, which were both used to legitimize Nasser’s programs in the 
name of Islam.  However, Nasser faced significant resistance from two 
sources: Saudi Arabia, which did not appreciate Nasser’s condemnation 
of conservative Muslim regimes, and the Muslim Brotherhood, which 
felt betrayed by Nasser’s failure to implement a traditional Islamic state 
and ordered its marginalization and prosecution.  In 1965, Nasser arrest-
ed members of the Muslim Brotherhood suspected of plotting his assas-
sination.
189
  One of the leaders detained by Nasser was the outspoken 
Egyptian Islamist Sayeed Qutb.
190
   
J. Sayeed Qutb and the Rise of the Contemporary Islamist Ideology: 
Sayeed Qutb grew up in Egypt where he was well versed in the 
classics of the European literary canon and influenced by Western dress 
and entertainment.
191
  However, as an adult, Qutb became an ardent anti-
colonial nationalist and a conservative Muslim.
192
  In 1948, while serv-
ing as a bureaucrat in the Egyptian government’s Ministry of Education, 
Qutb was sent to study at American universities.
193
  Qutb shared the 
widespread Arab sentiment against Western support for the creation of 
Israel and maintained strong views on women and sexuality, which he 
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tinued detrimental influence of Mossadegh’s overthrow in contemporary U.S.–Iranian 
relations.  While Kinzer sometimes indulges in Monday morning quarterbacking and 
places disproportionate blame on U.S. foreign policy, his account of history nonetheless 
serves as provocative commentary.). 
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saw as a corrupting force in American society.
194
  In 1949, when Qutb 
moved to the American West to further his graduate education, he was 
aghast at attending a college party and seeing, “dancing naked legs . . . 
arms draped around the waists, chests met chests, lips met lips, and the 
atmosphere was full of love.”
195
  Other similar impressions held a lasting 
impact over Qutb, and by the end of the year he was convinced of the 
moral degeneracy of the West.  When Qutb left America he concluded 
that America was a “spiritual wasteland.”
196
   
Upon returning to Egypt in 1950, Qutb published his views of 
America and what he believed was its non-existent moral value system, 
proclaiming, “ . . . the white man in Europe or America is our number-
one enemy.”  Author Lawrence Wright comments on Qutb: 
His concern was modernity.  Modern values – secularism, rationality, de-
mocracy, subjectivity, individualism, mixing of the sexes, tolerance, mate-
rialism – had infected Islam through the agency of western colonialism.  
America now stood for all that . . . . He intended to show that Islam and 
modernity were completely incompatible . . . . Separation of the sacred and 
the secular, state and religion, science and theology, mind and spirit, these 
were the hallmarks of modernity, which had captured the West.  But Islam 
could not abide such divisions . . . . Islam was total and uncompromising. It 
was God’s final word.
197
 
While Qutb originally supported Nasser during his early years in 
power, it soon became clear that Nasser’s program of Arab socialism did 
not comport with the objectives of Qutb, who held no desire for com-
promise in the demand for the implementation of Sharia.  Qutb was im-
prisoned for his political activities for the first time in 1954, and although 
he was briefly released after three months in jail, he was again arrested 
later that year for his involvement with the Muslim Brotherhood’s con-
spiracy to assassinate Nasser.
198
  After his trial in 1966, a mere show trial 
for the increasingly totalitarian Nasser regime, Qutb stated, “I performed 
jihad for fifteen years until I earned this martyrdom. . . . My words will 
be stronger if they kill me.”  Accordingly, Qutb was hung in August 
1966.
199
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IV. THE MODERN ISLAMIC WORLD AND THE CREATION OF AL-QAEDA  
A. Geo-Political Developments in the Muslim World during the 1960’s 
and 1970’s  
Contemporary scholarship in the West has paid significant attention 
to the long-term influence of Qutb in the expansion of the Islamist ideol-
ogy throughout the mid-twentieth century.
200
  The 9/11 Commission Re-
port accurately summarized the developments during the successive dec-
ades of the 1960’s and 1970’s in the Muslim world following the 
execution of Qutb: 
The secular regimes promised a glowing future, often tied to sweeping ide-
ologies (such as those promoted by Egyptian President Gamel Abdel Nas-
ser’s Arab Socialism or the Ba’ath Party of Syria and Iraq) that called for a 
single, secular Arab state.  However, what emerged were almost invariably 
autocratic regimes that were usually unwilling to tolerate any opposition – 
even in countries, such as Egypt, that had parliamentary tradition. Over 
time, their policies – repression, rewards, emigration, and the displacement 
of popular anger into scapegoats (generally foreign) – were shaped by the 
desire to cling to power.
201
 
Relations between the Islamic world and Israel reached a low when 
the Israelis defeated the united Arab armies in the 1967 “Six Day War,” 
which was a crushing military embarrassment for the Muslim communi-
ty.  Although often divided along nationalist and sectarian lines, efforts 
against Israel remained the one issue that the Muslim world continually 
rallied together to support.  Following the Six Day War, many Muslims 
were attracted to the idea of a more conservative approach to religion as 
they blamed the shameful military defeat of 1967 on the deviation from 
classical Islam.
202
  At the same time, the increasingly autocratic Islamic 
regimes successfully silenced or eliminated the more conservative Islam-
ist dissidents in their predominately secular nation-states.
203
  This di-
chotomy provided the foundation for the revolutionary fervor of 1979. 
                                                             
200 SCHEUER, supra note 5, at 42, 45 (arguing that some contemporary scholars erro-
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B. The Iranian Revolution, Sunni Extremism in Saudi Arabia, and the 
Afghan War   
Significant events in 1979 changed the fundamental structure of the 
Islamic world, and this new era was best characterized by the emergence 
of previously silenced Islamists.  The major developments of 1979 were 
highlighted by: (1) the Islamic Revolution of Iran and the rise of Ayatol-
lah Khomeini,
204
 (2) the revolt against the Saudi monarchy by dissi-
dents,
205
 and (3) the U.S.S.R. invasion of Afghanistan and the com-
mencement of the Afghan War.
206
  
The Islamic Revolution in Iran was the most visible of all three de-
velopments as it was ushered in by Iranian protesters against the Shah 
who held American citizens hostage at the U.S. embassy in Tehran.  The 
global media chronicled the daily developments of protests by Iranians 
against the policies of the well-known Shah, long admired in the West 
for his progressive ideology that was favorable to their interests.  The 
Iranian Revolution emanated in large part from the Shah’s failure to suc-
cessfully implement economic modernization and his increasingly dicta-
torial tendencies, which led to dissent among both the conservative Shia 
Islamic community and traditionalists in the professional class.  Many 
Iranians believed Shia Islam provided a viable alternative to the Shah’s 
efforts at Westernization and protesters used Shia religious symbols that 
linked the early struggles of Ali to the contemporary efforts against the 
Shah.
207
   
A long-standing critic of the Shah, Shia legal scholar Ruhollah 
Khomeini, returned from political exile in France to lead the opposition 
movement.
208
  Khomeini fused strong anti-Western and anti-Israeli 
views with his conservative Shiite religious training, and upon the over-
throw of the Shah, Khomeini was named the leader of Iran (the Ayatol-
lah).  As Ayatollah, Khomeini devised a unique system of Islamic gov-
ernance that elevated the Shia clerical establishment to the primary 
source of political and legal authority.
209
  Notably, immediately after the 
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regime change in Iran, in 1980 the Iran-Iraq War commenced.  The War 
pitted the majority Shia, and ethnically Persian, state of Iran against Iraqi 
strongman Saddam Hussein, a Sunni Arab leader that ruled over a major-
ity Shia, but ethnically Arab population.
210
  The United States and other 
Sunni Arab states supported the Iraqis, yet the bloody and destructive 
war between the Iranians and Iraqis lasted for the next eight years.
211
        
The second significant development occurred in Saudi Arabia, 
which witnessed the first manifestation of a rebellion by Islamists within 
its own borders.  In November 1979, the Grand Mosque in Mecca was 
held captive for two weeks by hundreds of protesters who criticized the 
Saudi monarchy and called for the establishment of an even more con-
servative Islamic state.
212
  While the Saudi leadership defused the situa-
tion by receiving a fatwa from the state-supported Islamic jurists (ulama) 
for Saudi forces to intervene, only a week later a Shia uprising ensued in 
the eastern part of Saudi Arabia, inspired by the recent ascent of Shia 
Aytollah Khomeini in Iran.
213
  The Saudi Arabian Shia claimed discrim-
ination by the Sunni majority (specifically, calling for a fairer distribu-
tion of oil wealth), and the Saudi Shiites were boosted by support from 
Ayatollah Khomeini, who used the uprising as an opportunity to criticize 
the rival Saudi regime and the other Sunni Arab states.
214
  The events in 
Saudi Arabia signified two emerging challenges for the Kingdom: (1) the 
threat posed by Sunni Islamists, and (2) the rise of Shia Iran as its major 
economic, political, and religious competitor in the Islamic world.
215
 
The third major development of 1979 began when the U.S.S.R. in-
vaded Afghanistan, and the Islamic forces that organized in opposition to 
the Soviet invasion later provided the foundation for the creation of Al-
Qaeda.  Following the end of World War II the Soviets asserted geo-
political influence over most of Central and Eastern Europe, lands that 
were also home to many Muslims who now lived within the orbit of the 
Communist superpower.
216
  A Communist uprising in 1978 in Afghani-
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stan was supported by the arrival of Soviet troops in 1979 to solidify Af-
ghanistan within the sphere of Soviet power.  However, in response the 
conservative leaders of the Muslim world called for jihad to resist the 
presence of the godless Soviets in Islamic lands.
217
  Buoyed by decades 
of Islamist momentum and a move within the larger Islamic world to-
ward more traditional Islam, the opportunity to fight jihad against the 
Soviets resonated with many Muslim men from the Middle East who 
traveled to Afghanistan and soon became known as the “Afghan Ar-
abs.”
218
  One of the individuals that joined the jihad was a wealthy young 
man from Saudi Arabia named Osama Bin Laden.
219
 
C. The Islamization of Osama Bin Laden 
Osama Bin Laden was the son of one of the most successful Saudi 
businessmen – one of fifty-four children from the elder Bin Laden’s 
twenty-two wives – whose childhood was filled with soccer games and 
television.
220
  At the age of fourteen, Bin Laden had a spiritual awaken-
ing that led him to believe Muslims had deviated from the true path of 
Islam, which moved him to personally become more pious and disavow 
Western dress and television shows.
221
  In particular, Bin Laden main-
tained piety in relation to sexuality, once admonishing a friend of his 
brother who owned a pornographic magazine.
222
  Bin Laden biographer 
Lawrence Wright noted that, “throughout his life, [Bin Laden] would 
hunger for austerity like a vice: the desert, the cave, and his yet unspoken 
desire to die anonymously in a trench in warfare.”
223
  In the early 1970’s 
Bin Laden joined a Saudi affiliate of the Muslim Brotherhood, at the 
time an underground and non-mainstream Islamist movement in Arabia, 
and began to pray for the reestablishment of a unified Islamic state.
224
 
In 1976 Bin Laden enrolled at the King Abdul Aziz University in 
Saudi Arabia to study economics, yet his attention remained focused on 
interpreting the Quran, jihad, and establishing an Islamic charity.
225
  
While at university, Bin Laden read Sayeed Qutb’s novels and attended 
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the weekly speeches of Sayeed Qutb’s brother, Mohammad Qutb, who 
served as a lecturer for the school.
226
  At the time Mohammad Qutb was 
defending his brother’s intellectual legacy from the ideas of Hasan 
Hudaybi, another Islamic scholar who argued the militant positions of 
Qutb had gone too far and Muslims should not judge the piety of other 
Muslims.
227
  The opposing visions of Hudaybi and Qutb launched a de-
bate within Egypt about what it meant to be a Muslim, and, while Bin 
Laden was originally persuaded by the ideas of Hudaybi, with the pas-
sage of time his views evolved to be much more in accordance with the 
militant Islamist ideology espoused by Qutb.
228
    
D. Bin Laden Joins the Jihad 
In 1980, at the age of twenty-three, Bin Laden traveled to Afghani-
stan to join the fight against the Soviets but differed from other jihadists 
because of his wealth and family background.
229
  The unique connec-
tions of Bin Laden led him to become a leading financier for jihad opera-
tions in Afghanistan, which were also being supported covertly by the 
United States which sought to halt the spread of communism.
230
  Along 
with prominent Egyptian Islamist Dr. Abdullah Azzam, Bin Laden uti-
lized his contacts in Pakistan to develop an organization that channeled 
both fighters and funding in efforts against the Soviets.
231
  In part be-
cause of the efforts of Bin Laden, by 1988 between ten and twenty thou-
sand fighters had completed training for jihad in Afghanistan.
232
  
In 1987, as the Afghan War became heavily tilted in the Islamic re-
sistance fighters’ favor, the organizational infrastructure in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan developed by Azzam and Bin Laden evolved into the foun-
dation for a new Islamist group called Al-Qaeda (“the base”).
233
  Upon 
the death of Azzam in 1989, Bin Laden stood as the uncontested leader 
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of Al-Qaeda.
234
  At the time of the withdrawal from Afghanistan and 
subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, the stated objective of Al-
Qaeda was to overthrow Islamic dictators in the Middle East and return 
the Muslim community to the true form of classical Islam.
235
  Bin Laden 
biographer Michael Scheuer emphasizes the transformative impact of the 
defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan, the first military victory for Mus-
lims in centuries, which evoked a sense of accomplishment and pride 
throughout the entire Islamic world.
236
  According to Scheuer, through 
the eyes of Bin Laden, “Moscow’s withdrawal from Afghanistan . . . 
gave instant plausibility to the idea that non-Muslim interference in the 
Muslim world justified a defensive jihad, and that such a jihad could 
succeed.”
237
   
E. How the First Gulf War Leads Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda to View 
America as the Enemy 
After a peace treaty was reached to end the Iran-Iraq War in Sad-
dam Hussein’s slight favor, it motivated the emboldened Iraqi dictator to 
undertake the annexation of an oil rich neighbor, the small Sunni Arab 
state of Kuwait.
238
  In response Bin Laden offered Saudi Arabia, aligned 
in defense of the sovereignty of Kuwait, the support of Al-Qaeda to de-
fend against the acts of Iraqi aggression.
239
  However, Bin Laden was 
spited by the Saudi leadership in favor of American forces, which uti-
lized Saudi military bases within the territory of the Kingdom to success-
fully launch counter-attacks on Iraq in the Gulf War.
240
  The rejection by 
Saudi Arabia, coupled with the utilization of American forces instead of 
Al-Qaeda in Islamic lands, incensed Bin Laden and left him convinced 
that the United States was the cause of the problems facing the Islamic 
community.
241
 
Following the Afghan War, in 1991 Bin Laden moved to the Sudan 
where he consolidated his authority over Al-Qaeda and set up a platform 
for commercial operations that funded the terrorist activities of the or-
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ganization.
242
  By this time Bin Laden had become a well-known Islam-
ist in the ideologically influential areas of Egypt, the Arabian Peninsula, 
and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, and in 1992 Al-Qaeda is-
sued its first fatwa against the United States for its occupation of Muslim 
lands during the Gulf War.
243
  Later, in a 1996 fatwa Bin Laden called 
for an uprising against the monarchy in Saudi Arabia, as well as attacks 
against the United States, which he criticized as the enabler of wayward 
Muslim governments.
244
  In the fatwa against Saudi Arabia and the Unit-
ed States, Bin Laden attempted to appeal to the larger Islamist cause with 
the hope that the mission of Al-Qaeda would transcend ethnic and geo-
graphic boundaries of the modern Islamic world.
245
  Analyst Sean Wil-
son notes the 1996 fatwa outlined Al-Qaeda’s three distinct objectives: 
“[1] the overthrow of the Saudi government for its betrayal of Islam; [2] 
the expulsion of the United States from Muslim lands; and [3] the estab-
lishment of a true Islamic state (the caliphate).”
246
 
F. The Growth of Al-Qaeda under Bin Laden in Afghanistan 
When small attacks by Al-Qaeda between 1992 and 1996 failed to 
generate a significant response from the international community, Bin 
Laden sought to expand his jihad beyond the confines of the Islamic 
world.  In a 1998 fatwa, Bin Laden first announced his intention to attack 
U.S. and European interests in their own homeland.
247
  Upon pressure 
from the United States and Saudi Arabia, Bin Laden was expelled from 
the Sudan in May 1996 but quickly found refuge in Afghanistan.  Central 
to Bin Laden’s decision to go to Afghanistan was its geographical prox-
imity to Pakistan, a traditionally secular Islamic state which experienced 
a resurgence of traditionalist Islamic teachings since the 1970’s.
248
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Southeast Asian Islamic revivalism – best exhibited by the Deoban-
di movement, an Islamist ideology in existence since the nineteenth cen-
tury that incorporated elements of Wahhabism – provided a fertile ideo-
logical climate for Al-Qaeda and its objectives.
249
  Bin Laden’s arrival 
coincided with the 1996 capture of Kabul by the Taliban (translated as 
“students”), a group of ethnic Pashtun Sunni Muslims led by many indi-
viduals who studied at Islamic schools (madrassas) and trained in camps 
created by Bin Laden.
250
  Importantly, in 1995 the revivalist Taliban was 
recognized by the Pakistani government as the ruling power of Afghani-
stan, and between 1995 and 2001, relations flourished between the Tali-
ban and the Pakistani intelligence service, the Inter-Services Intelligence 
(ISI) agency.
251
           
Once in Afghanistan, Bin Laden possessed a missionary zeal in his 
pursuit of attacking American interests and orchestrated the August 1998 
bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.  While the U.S. re-
sponded with aerial strikes that unsuccessfully attempted to kill Bin Lad-
en, Al-Qaeda struck again in October 2000 with an attack on the U.S.S. 
Cole.  Notably, the attack on the Cole led Bin Laden to comment, “I 
knelt to thank God for this heroic operation that damaged the prestige of 
the United States and served as a warning for them to leave the Arab 
world . . . .”
252
  After the attack on the Cole, Bin Laden further solidified 
his ties with Taliban leader Mullah Omar to prepare his organization for 
the aftermath of a large scale attack that he believed would initiate a di-
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rect confrontation with the United States.
253
  Upon receiving confirma-
tion of the strike against America on 9/11, Bin Laden proclaimed, 
“[t]here is America, hit by God in one of its softest spots . . . God has di-
vided the world in two-sides – the side of the believers and the side of 
the infidels . . . . Every Muslim has to rush to make his religion victori-
ous. The winds of faith have come.”
254
         
V. ON AL-QAEDA: 9/11 TO THE PRESENT 
A. The Response Begins: The War in Afghanistan 
It is important to trace developments following 9/11 until the pre-
sent that will likely shape the operative environment of Al-Qaeda and the 
Islamist ideology in the early twenty-first century.  The attacks of 9/11 
led to an immediate shift in President George W. Bush’s political agenda 
from an initial focus on domestic initiatives to a two-term presidency 
consumed by foreign policy, most specifically the War on Terrorism.
255
  
Central to his administration’s counter-terrorism policy was the enact-
ment of the “Bush Doctrine,” which held terrorist attacks would be treat-
ed as acts of war (and not crimes) and the U.S. would make no distinc-
tion between terrorists and the states that harbor them.
256
  Within weeks 
of 9/11 the U.S. launched an attack on Afghanistan to overthrow the Tal-
iban and capture or kill Bin Laden.  While the capital city of Kabul was 
in American possession by mid-November, the Al-Qaeda leader evaded 
capture in Afghanistan and fled into the familiar – but to U.S. forces, ter-
ritorially unfriendly – mountainous border region with Pakistan.
257
  After 
overthrowing the Taliban, American forces presided over democratic 
elections in Afghanistan which led to the election of President Hamid 
Karzi in 2004 and a new parliament in 2005.
258
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B. The War on Terror Expands: The Second Gulf War and the 
Removal of Saddam Hussein 
Following the end of Taliban control in Afghanistan, the Bush ad-
ministration shifted its attention toward Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi dicta-
tor whom neoconservatives now in a position to influence U.S. foreign 
policy long desired to remove from power.
259
  The primary justification 
provided by the Americans in their case against Hussein was his alleged 
possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), a claim supported 
by flawed intelligence provided by Iraqi exiles in the 2002 U.S. National 
Intelligence Estimate.  In October 2002, Congress authorized President 
Bush to form a coalition in preparation for invasion, and with primary 
allied support limited to that of Great Britain, in March 2003 the U.S. 
commenced Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Although American forces easily 
secured control of Iraq and captured Hussein in December 2003, the situ-
ation in Iraq quickly deteriorated as Iraqi militias representing sectarian 
Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish interests led the country to the brink of civil 
war.
260
 
C. Outsourcing Islamism: The Rise of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) 
While the U.S. engagement in Afghanistan ended the sanctuary sta-
tus for Al-Qaeda training camps, the organization still remained opera-
tional to coordinate attacks in Indonesia, Kenya, Tunisia, Morocco, 
Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Spain, and Britain.
261
  While diligent counter-
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terrorism reforms by national governments constricted the ability of Al-
Qaeda to continue its spree of international terror, the sectarian violence 
in Iraq presented a new front for the organization to operate.
262
  Follow-
ing the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Islamist religious leaders – in particular 
those from Saudi Arabia – issued fatwas that called on Muslims to fight a 
defensive jihad, a message that resonated in particular with the Sunni 
community in Iraq.
263
  Led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, an individual first 
introduced to Wahhabi Islam in a Palestinian refugee camp, Al-Qaeda in 
Iraq (AQI) served as an outsourced affiliate of the core organization built 
by Bin Laden.  Using the internet as a means of recruiting and aided by 
the Abu Graib prison abuse scandal, AQI utilized both the quarter-
million newly unemployed Iraqi men and foreign fighters who arrived 
for jihad against both the American forces and the Shia majority in 
Iraq.
264
  At its apex of influence in 2006-2007, the AQI organization 
maintained the capacity to cause up to 185 casualties per day, an almost 
unfathomable figure indicative of the level of violence experienced dur-
ing the worst days of the U.S. occupation.
265
 
Policy analyst M.J. Kirdar notes that in the early stages of the 
American occupation AQI provided the core Al-Qaeda organization with 
three major objectives: (1) furthering their notion of a war on Islam by 
the powers of the West, (2) unifying disparate Islamist groups against a 
common enemy, the United States, and (3) serving as a sanctuary for Al-
Qaeda operatives and foreign jihadists.
266
  However, the tactical over-
reach of AQI – exemplified by its Taliban-like attempt to implement 
Sharia and the refusal to cease its use of indiscriminate violence – led 
100,000 individuals to disavow support for the organization.
267
   As a re-
sult, the mass defection of AQI operatives damaged the local brand of 
Al-Qaeda and defectors provided valuable intelligence to aid in counter-
terrorism efforts.
268
  The death of Zarqawi in 2006, coupled with the 
                                                                                                                                        
attacks following 2001 were linked to Pakistan: “The July 7, 2005 attack in London, for 
example was carried out by British jihadists who were trained in Pakistan and connected 
to Al-Qaeda. Their martyrdom videos were played on Al-Qaeda’s propaganda tapes with 
Bin Laden’s deputy, Zawahiri, providing commentary.”). 
262 Al Qaeda After Bin Laden, supra note 151. 
263 Rick Nelson & Thomas M. Sanderson, Al Qaeda in Iraq, CTR FOR STRATEGIC & 
INT’L STUD. 1, 8 (2011), available at http://csis.org/files/publication/110614 
_Kirdar_AlQaedaIraq_Web.pdf. 
264 Id. 
265 Id. 
266 Id. 
267 Id. 
268 Id. 
362 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION [Vol.  3::10 
success of President Bush’s “troop surge” under General David Petraus, 
led to a precipitous decline in violence and veered Iraq away from a civil 
war.
269
 
D. Al-Qaeda: 2007 – 2010 
While the U.S. succeeded in quelling the sectarian violence in Iraq 
and containing the destructive capabilities of AQI, the larger Al-Qaeda 
organization remained a relevant threat to the United States and the in-
ternational community.  In 2007, Al-Qaeda affiliates assassinated the in-
ternationally admired Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto for her 
attempts to crack down on the organization’s presence within Pakistan’s 
borders.
270
  Not surprisingly, the long suspected ties between Al-Qaeda 
and the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) were again affirmed as 
the ISI cleaned the crime scene prior to the procurement of evidence.
271
  
In November 2008, Pakistani jihadists in Mumbai, India, massacred ci-
vilians as the attackers held hostages at the famed Taj Mahal hotel in the 
single most deadly terrorist attack since 9/11.  David Headley, a Paki-
stani-American with ties to the Pakistani ISI and Al-Qaeda, helped facili-
tate the attack by providing tactical information to Lashkar-e-Taiba, the 
Islamist group responsible for the plot and its implementation.
272
    
As Islamist attacks were being launched on non-American interests, 
terrorist plots with links to Al-Qaeda continued to target the American 
homeland.  In December 2009 a Nigerian jihadist with ties to Al-Qaeda 
unsuccessfully attempted to blow up an airliner during a flight from Am-
sterdam to Detroit with a bomb in his underwear that went undetected.  
Subsequently, U.S. counter-terrorism officials halted Al-Qaeda plots to 
attack the New York City subway system and Chicago cargo jets.
273
   
Again, in April 2010 a Pakistani, with ties to the Taliban, attempted to 
explode a car bomb in the middle of New York City’s Times Square on a 
bustling Saturday evening.  Only the diligence of a local street vendor, 
who noticed smoke coming from a suspicious vehicle, enabled the New 
York Police Department to stop the imminent and potentially devastating 
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attack from materializing.
274
  
E. The 2010-2011 “Arab Spring” 
In December 2010 a twenty-six year-old Tunisian fruit and vegeta-
ble merchant, Mohamed Bouazizi, was harassed by the police to pay a 
bribe to allow him to continue selling his goods.  Upon refusal, the police 
beat Bouazizi and proceeded to steal his produce and weighing scale.  
Following unsuccessful attempts to contact the Governor to voice his 
grievances, an infuriated Bouazizi soaked himself in petrol and lit him-
self on fire, causing burns on ninety percent of his body.
275
  Bouazizi’s 
actions set off a chain of events that led to an unexpected revolution 
throughout the Islamic world, now collectively known as the “Arab 
Spring.”
276
   
Bouazizi’s story immediately unleashed a wave of protests and riots 
throughout the streets of Tunisia, a country plagued by chronic unem-
ployment and inflation as well as rampant political corruption and crony-
ism.  With historical precedent on his side, Tunisian President Ben Ali 
did not view the protesters as a real threat and had little reason to believe 
that the twenty-three year reign of his military autocracy was in jeop-
ardy.
277
  Upon the death of Bouazizi, however, the riots intensified and 
only nine days later Ali abdicated his position as president for political 
asylum in Saudi Arabia.  BBC security correspondent Frank Gardner 
succinctly encapsulated the surprising developments: “The rule of Presi-
dent Ben Ali was over, triggered on the face of it, by the suicidal actions 
of a frustrated grocer.”
278
 
After the events in Tunisia, the momentum shifted to Egypt as a 
wave of reform rapidly spread throughout the Islamic world.  National 
Public Radio (NPR) summarized the developments in December 2011: 
Egypt: Government overthrown on February 11, 2011.  President Hosni 
Mubarak steps down, faces charges of killing unarmed protesters.  Elec-
tions held on November 28, 2011.  Protests continue in Tahrir Square. 
Libya: Anti-government protests begin on February 15, 2011, leading to 
civil war between opposition forces and Moammar Gadhafi loyalists. Trip-
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oli was captured and the government overthrown on August 23, 2011.  
Gadhafi was killed by transition forces on October 20, 2011. 
Syria: Protests for political reforms have been ongoing since January 26, 
2011 with continuing clashes between the Syrian army and protesters.  On 
one day in July, 136 people were killed when Syrian army tanks stormed 
several cities. 
Yemen: Ongoing protests since February 3, 2011.  President Ali Abdullah 
Saleh is injured in an attack on June 4, 2011.  On November 23, 2011, he 
signs a power-transfer agreement ending his 33-year reign. 
Other nations: Protests and uprisings related to the Arab Spring also took 
place in other countries as well, including: Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Morocco, and Oman.
279
 
In analyzing the events of the Arab Spring, Islamic commentator 
Mansoor Moaddel distinguished the events of 2011 from the wave of re-
form that swept the Islamic world during the 1950’s and 1960’s, when 
Arab nationalism rose to prominence (i.e. Nasserism).
280
  Moaddel opti-
mistically noted that unlike the Arab nationalist movements which oc-
curred over a half-century ago, the Arab Spring was largely non-
ideological.
281
  To support his position, Moaddel cited the 84% of Egyp-
tians and 66% of Lebanese who responded to pollsters that the current 
movements were intended to produce freedom and democracy or eco-
nomic prosperity.
282
  Lastly, Moaddel emphasized the transformative na-
ture of the internet and text messaging which provided new avenues for 
young activists to circumvent government authorities in organizing polit-
ically.
283
 
Although the events of the Arab Spring were welcomed with open 
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arms by many in the international community, the realist approach to in-
ternational politics suggested a cautionary pause, as these events gave 
rise to an uncertain future and a vacuum of power in the Islamic world.   
Almost foreshadowing the predicament American policymakers find 
themselves in today, the current President of the Council on Foreign Re-
lations Richard Haass noted in 2004 that, “a lesson we should have 
learned from what took place in Iran twenty-five years ago, namely, that 
unattractive authoritarian regimes can be replaced by something far 
worse.”
284
  Raghida Dergham, a journalist for the pan-Arab newspaper 
Al-Hayat, commented on the unsuspecting role of Islamists in Egypt fol-
lowing the overthrow of the Mubarak regime: while the youth led the 
protests with hopes of bringing Egypt into modernity, the more experi-
enced and organized Islamist parties subsequently took advantage of the 
opportunity created by the protesters.
285
  Imploring the women of Egypt 
to rise up, Dergham pessimistically concluded that if women failed to as-
sert their voice in the political process, men will maintain the authority to 
interpret the laws of Sharia and the “Arab Awakening will end in the 
Slumber of Dark Ages.”
286
      
F. The Assassination of Osama Bin Laden 
With the dust barely settled from the Arab Spring – and arguably, 
still settling – during the evening of April 30, 2011, President Obama 
summoned the American media for an unexpected presidential an-
nouncement.  From the East Room of the White House, President Obama 
explained to the American people that on his orders U.S. forces killed 
Bin Laden in a targeted operation at a compound in Abbottabad, Paki-
stan.  President Obama asserted: 
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For over two decades, Bin Laden has been Al-Qaeda’s leader and symbol. . 
. . The death of Bin Laden marks the most significant achievement to date 
in our nation’s effort to defeat Al-Qaeda.  But his death does not mark the 
end of our effort.  There’s no doubt that Al-Qaeda will continue to pursue 
attacks against us.  We must and we will remain vigilant at home and 
abroad.
287
 
Following the announcement, the major American news outlets cap-
tured Americans – in particular, college-aged Americans – pouring into 
the streets outside the White House and Times Square to celebrate the 
death of the founder of Al-Qaeda.
288
  Isobel Coleman, a contributor to 
the Council on Foreign Relations, noted that the reaction in Pakistan to 
the news of Bin Laden’s death was significantly more nuanced: Coleman 
cited a reader’s comment posted on the website of a leading Pakistani 
newspaper that stated, “My Muslim friends are happy that Bin Laden is 
dead, but they are afraid to say that publicly.”
289
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A. Al-Qaeda Today: A Three-Tiered Movement 
With both the historical background of Islam and development of 
Al-Qaeda until the present day established, one primary question re-
mains: What is the state of Al-Qaeda today?  Rick Nelson, Director of 
the Center for Strategic and International Studies, constructively labels 
the current structure of Al-Qaeda as a movement – not an organization – 
with three distinct branches: (1) Al-Qaeda core, (2) Al-Qaeda associated 
movements, and (3) Al-Qaeda inspired movements.  Al-Qaeda core re-
                                                             
287 Peter Baker et al., Bin Laden is Dead, Obama Says, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/02/world/asia/osama-bin-laden-is-killed.html?page 
wanted=all. 
288 Id. 
289 Isobel Coleman, Pakistani Reactions to Bin Laden’s Demise, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN RELATIONS (May 3, 2011), http://blogs.cfr.org/coleman/2011/05/03/ pakistani-
reactions-to-bin-ladens-demise/; see Pakistan Condemns Bin Laden Raid and US Drone 
Attacks, BBC NEWS (May 14, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk /news/world-south-asia-
13398281 (following the Bin Laden assassination the Pakistani government criticized 
both the raid and the numerous U.S. drone strikes within their territory.  At the time cor-
respondents commented that relations between Pakistan and the U.S. were “at an all-time 
low.”); see also Nathan Gardels, The Arab Spring After Osama: Ayaan Hirsi Ali vs. Tariq 
Ramadan, HUFFINGTON POST (May 7, 2011 11:35 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nathan-gardels/the-arab-spring-after-osa_b_8 58956.html 
(contrasting viewpoints on the impact of the Arab Spring and the death of Bin Laden on 
the Islamic world). 
2013] ISLAMIC HISTORY & AL-QAEDA 367 
fers to the command center of the organization formed by Bin Laden, 
traditionally based out of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
290
  Information ob-
tained from the compound of Bin Laden following his assassination sug-
gested he remained more involved in the daily activities of the organiza-
tion than previously believed, but his inability to control operatives such 
as Zarqawi of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) also depicts the limitations of the 
core leadership to control its affiliates.
291 
 Although the U.S. has predom-
inately eliminated the original pre-9/11 infrastructure of Al-Qaeda, the 
groups and individuals acting in the name of Al-Qaeda remain a signifi-
cant threat to American interests.
292
       
The second group, Al-Qaeda associated movements, refers to the 
loosely affiliated organizations working under the larger mantle of Al-
Qaeda, such as Zarqawi’s AQI, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP), and the Somali based groups, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM) and al-Shabbab.
293
  By establishing streams of revenue through 
the narcotics trade and kidnapping activities, Al-Qaeda associated organ-
izations have ensured their medium-term financial sustainability.
294
  
Moreover, these smaller affiliate organizations pose unique challenges to 
American security interests because of their propensity to engage in fre-
quent, but inexpensive attacks (such as the attempted Christmas Day 
bombing, which was facilitated by AQAP).
295
   
The third group, Al-Qaeda inspired movements (“lone wolves”), is 
defined as individual cells unaffiliated with the official Al-Qaeda organi-
zation.
296
  While lone wolf operations are a newer development, they 
have already been evidenced in the U.S. homeland, most notably by the 
attempt of the Times Square bomber and a 2009 shooting at the Fort 
Hood military base by Nidal Hasan, a U.S. army officer who attacked in 
protest of American involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Nelson con-
cludes that at this juncture, Al-Qaeda affiliate groups and lone wolf oper-
atives remain the greatest threat because of their focus on small scale at-
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tacks and the limited financial resources available to American security 
officials to protect against such operations.
297
  
B. Closing Argument 
The focus of this analysis depicts how the objectives of Al-Qaeda 
operate within a much broader story of Islamic history that remains 
largely unknown to the American public.  As the historical record clearly 
delineates, Islamist ideas are embedded throughout the Islamic tradition 
and are not the machinations of a single crazed lunatic in an empty cave, 
as some in the West have satirically portrayed Bin Laden.
298
  The astute 
Washington Post reporter David Ignatius used the one-year anniversary 
of the assassination of Bin Laden as an opportunity to acknowledge the 
historical nature of Islamist movements as it pertained to the Arab 
Spring:  
What’s happened in the last year is a rejection of the super-violent tactics 
that Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda have used to try to purge this Western influ-
ence from the Islamic world.  But the idea is still there, and the people who 
were the kind of ideological forbearers, Hassan al-Banna, the founder of 
the Muslim Brotherhood, [and] Sayyed Qutb, a key Muslim Brotherhood 
figure, those are the people that many of these new Islamist politicians who 
are in office, members of the Egyptian Parliament . . . . [T]hey look to these 
people and their indignation against the West and the desire to have a sepa-
rate kind of life.
299
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In the years and decades to come, the level of support for Al-Qaeda 
and its ideology is likely to be determined by the environment within the 
larger Islamic world.  The destabilizing events of the Arab Spring pro-
vide the Islamic world with yet another opportunity for reform, but as the 
history contained in this thesis has shown, reform in Islam has recently 
veered more towards Islamist revivalism than liberalization.  Will history 
repeat itself once again? 
In a recent interview with the Wall Street Journal, Bernard Lewis – 
a leading British-American expert on Islamic history cited throughout 
this work – was asked about his views on the Arab Spring.  In response, 
Lewis straightforwardly opined, “I think that the tyrannies are doomed, 
the real question is what will come instead.”
300
  While Lewis noted the 
influence of the young activists whose political mobilization led to sig-
nificant changes in the Islamic world in the past two years, he cautioned 
that he had seen similar optimism before and remained reluctant to pro-
claim victory for the liberal reformers.
301
  Lewis concluded the interview 
by stating, “I think the struggle will continue until [the Islamists] either 
obtain their objective or renounce it.  At the moment, both seem equally 
improbable.”
302
 
Following the June 2012 U.S. drone assassination of Abu al-Libi, 
the number two leader of Al-Qaeda based out of Pakistan, the respected 
CNN terrorism analyst Peter Bergen commented that, “the terrorist group 
that launched the 9/11 attacks is now more of less out of business.”  Ber-
gen noted Al-Qaeda has failed to successfully attack the United States in 
over a decade, and while he agreed lone wolf attacks remain a threat, he 
argued only seventeen Americans were killed in such attacks since 
9/11.
303
  In contrast, Bergen highlighted the average of fifty-four Ameri-
cans killed each year by lightning, leading him to surmise that, “to the 
average American, lightning is about 30 times more deadly than jihadist 
terrorism.”
304
  Although Bergen’s work is often laudable, by comparing 
the likelihood of jihadist terrorism to a bolt of lightning, Bergen is at risk 
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of trivializing the continued national security interest in understanding 
Islam, Islamic history, and the extremism espoused by Islamist ideas.   
Beyond Al-Qaeda and other like-minded organizations, Islamism is 
alive and well, and the influence of the Islamist ideology remains wholly 
relevant to understanding the complexities of the modern Islamic world.   
Policy analyst Seth G. Jones provides an insightful conclusion on the 
threat posed by Al-Qaeda: 
[D]eclarations of victory, however, underestimate al-Qaeda’s continuing capacity 
for destruction.  Far from being dead and buried, the terrorist organization is now 
riding a resurgent tide as its affiliates engage in increasingly violent campaign of 
attacks across the Middle East and North Africa.  And for all the admiration in-
spired by brave protesters in the streets from Damascus to Sanaa, the growing in-
stability triggered by the Arab Spring has provided al-Qaeda with fertile ground to 
expand its influence across the region.
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The evolving dynamics of the Islamic world currently project an 
uncertain future as evidenced by the following: increasing violence in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan, the ascending prominence of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt, lingering questions surrounding the intentions of 
Iranian nuclear development, and continuing sectarian bloodshed in Syr-
ia.  History strongly suggests the strategic challenges presented by ele-
ments of the Islamist ideology — most specifically, acts of violence per-
petuated in its name — will remain wholly relevant to the national 
security concerns of America and many other members of the interna-
tional community.  American interests will be well served if our leaders 
understand and encourage meaningful dialogue related to the roots of 
modern Islamist movements and their interpretation of Islamic history.
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